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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Adverse Possession-Effect of Tenant's Attornment to True Owner
In a recent decision, it was held that a tenant's attornment to the
true owner of land which was held adversely by tenant's lessor, did not
interrupt the running of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor,
when the true owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.' The
court based its opinion on the principles that the possession of the tenant
is the possession of the landlord and that a tenant is estopped to deny the
title of the landlord.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has defined adverse possession
as: "actual possession, with an intent to hold solely for the possessor to
the exclusion of others, and is denoted by the exercise of acts of dominion
over the land, in making the ordinary use and taking the ordinary profits
of which it is susceptible in its present state, such acts to be so repeated
as to show that they are done in the character of owner, in opposition
to right or claim of any other person, and not merely an occasional tres-
pass. It must be as decided and notorious as the nature of the land will
permit, affording unequivocal indication to all persons that he is exer-
cising thereon the dominion of owner."'2 Adverse possession consists of
five essential elements: (1) the possession must be hostile and under
claim of right; (2) it must be actual; (3) it must be open and notorious;
(4) it must be exclusive; and (5) it must be continuous. 3 If any one
of these elements is lacking, the holding will not be effective to allow
acquisition of title by adverse possession.
One holding land adversely may do so through his tenant, and the
possession of the tenant will be the possession of the landlord.4 How-
'Kimble v. Willey, 204 F. 2d 238 (8th Cir. 1953). A was record owner of
property in controversy. B, in 1930, acquired title by deed from holder of a void
tax deed, which at best, could serve only as color of title. B leased the land to C
for one year for $1.00 with the proviso that any holding over by C would be a
holding for B. In 1931, while the original term was still in effect, C solicited and
obtained a lease from A.
2 Locklear v. Savage, 159 N. C. 236, 237, 74 S. E. 347, 348 (1912). In North
Carolina, the statutes provide that one holding land adversely, may acquire title
after twenty years uninterrupted holding, or after seven years uninterrupted holding
under color of title. [N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-38, 40 (1953)]. Other states have
similar statutes with varying time limits. ARK. STAT. § 37-101 (1947), pleaded by
defendant in the principal case, provides that no suit may be maintained for pos-
session of lands after seven years adverse holding.
SBelatti v. Bickhart, 228 N. Y. 296, 127 N. E. 239 (1920) ; Newkirk v. Porter,
237 N. C. 115, 74 S. E. 2d 235 (1952) ; III Am. LAw OF PROPERTY, § 15.3 (1952).
' Howell v. Baskins, 213 Ark. 665, 212 S. W. 2d 353 (1948) ; Fugl v. Edwards,
96 Cal. App. 2d 460, 215 P. 2d 802 (1950) ; Kellogg v. Huffman, 137 Cal. App.
278, 30 P. 2d 593 (1934) ; Walker v. Bell, 154 Neb. 221, 47 N. W. 2d 504 (1951)
Jackson v. Gallegos, 38 N. M. 211, 30 P. 2d 719 (1934) ; Cook v. Winter, 207 S. W.
2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947) ; Note, 30 MicHa L. REv. 429 (1932).
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ever, the elements of adverse possession must still be present. If, then,
the tenant voluntarily attorns5 to the true owner of the land, is not one
of the essential elements destroyed? Voluntary attornment by the lessee
of an adverse possessor to the record title holder would seem to divest
the holding of its hostile character. 6
If the holding is to constitute an effective adverse possession, it must
be continuous and uninterrupted on the part of the adverse claimant.
Where a tenant who purports to be holding and acting for his landlord
voluntarily attorns to the true owner, it would seem that this act would
break the continuity of the holding.
7
The court, in the instant case, relied on the principle that a tenant
is estopped to deny his landlord's title and applied it to a situation where
the tenant voluntarily attorned to the true owner and where the true
owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.
In actions in ejectment or for collection of rent, there can be little
doubt that the doctrine of estoppel as to tenants is sound," and the courts
' Attornment has been variously defined as: ". . . the act of recognizing a new
landlord. The word comes from a feudal law, where it signifies the transfer by
the act of the lord with the consent of the tenant of all service, and homage of the
tenant to some new lord who had acquired the estate." [Willis v. Moore, 59 Tex.
628, 636 (1883)] ". . . an acknowledgment or agreement by the tenant that the
freehold is in another or that such person is his landlord." [Foster v. Morris, 10 Ky.
610, 611 (1821)] ".... the acknowledgment by a tenant that he holds under a new
lord who claims by title paramount, and not by grant of the reversion or as privy
to the reversioner." [Rochester Say. Bank v. Stoeltzer & Tapper, 176 Misc. 147,
26 N. Y. S. 2d 713, 716 (Sup. Ct. 1941).] See also Hankins v. Smith, 103 Fla.
892, 138 So. 494 (1935) ; Snyder v. Bernstein Bros., 201 Iowa 931, 208 N. W. 503
(1926); Hemminger v. Klaproth, 15 N. J. Misc. 163, 189 Ati. 363 (C. P. 1937) ;
Del-New Co. v. James, 111 N. J. L. 157, 167 Atd. 747 (Sup. Ct. 1933) ; New York
Rys. Corp. v. Savoy Associates, 239 App. Div. 504, 268 N. Y. Supp. 181 (1st Dept.
1933); Commonwealth Mortgage Co. v. DeWaltoff, 135 App. Div. 33, 119 N. Y.
Supp. 781 (1st Dept. 1909).
'Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872) ; Ross v. Dysart, 33 Pa. St. 452
(1859) ; Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. 203 (1852) ; Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v.
Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
As to the proposition that a tenant's attornment to one holding paramount title
in order to avoid litigation is equivalent to an actual ouster, see: Charles Merryman
v. E. W. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592 (U. S. 1870); Benaiah Morse v. Silas Goddard, 13
Metc. 177 (Mass. 1847) ; Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 384, 297 S. W. 374 (1925) ;
In re O'Donnell, 240 N. Y. 99, 147 N. E. 541 (1925). See also III Am. LAW OF
PROPERTY § 15.9 (1952) : "But it is clear, of course, that an attornment to the true
owner by the tenant makes his possession that of such owner and therefore ends
the adverse possession."
Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App.
1913).
8 Because of the personal relationship of lord and tenant during the feudal system
and the method of land holding then in vogue, it was necessary, to save the lord the
expense and trouble of defending against disseisin, that a tenant not be allowed to
deny his lord's title and acknowledge another as his lord. The principle was made
statutory by 11 GEORGE II, c. 19, § 11 (1738) which provided that attornment to a
stranger should be void unless pursuant to a decree of court or with consent of the
lessor. [I AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY, § 3.65 (1952).]
In actions for collection of rent or for possession, where a tenant has acquired
possession of property, used it as his own without interference, and has received
what he bargained for, he should not be relieved of his obligations merely by being
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have so held in a substantial majority of the decided cases.9 But where
the action involves only the title to land, a different situation arises.
The purpose of the statutes concerning adverse possession is not to take
property away from the true owner and give it to an adverse claimant,
but to allow such an adverse claimant to acquire title to property which
he has possessed and used as his own for the required number of years
and which has been neglected by the true owner without any assertion
of his rights of ownership. 10
Numerous cases hold that an attornment by an adverse possessor's
tenant to a third party does not interrupt the running of the statute."
Few situations, however, have come before the courts wherein the true
owner had no notice of the tenancy relationship.
Generally, decisions on the question fall into three categories, wherein
courts have held: (1) that an attornment by a tenant to another party
does not interrupt the running of the statute in favor of tenant's lessor,
regardless of the question of notice ;12 (2) that such an attornment does
allowed to find flaws in his landlord's title and claim that his landlord does not
have title to the land. [Vernam v. Smith, 15 N. Y. 327 (Ct. of App. 1857) ; Marina-
duke v. McDonald, 51 P. 2d 484 (Okla. 1935).]
' Townsend Peyton v. Joseph Stith, 5 Pet. 485 (U. S. 1831) ; Rogers v. Boynton,
57 Ala. 501 (1877); Manusco v. Santucci, 60 A. 2d 697 (D. C. Mun. Ct. App.
1948); Federal Land Bank of New Orleans v. Spencer, 160 So. 175 (La. Ct. App.
1935); Renshaw v. Reynolds, 317 Mo. 384, 297 S. W. 374 (1925) ; Gies v. Storz
Brewing Co., 75 Neb. 698, 106 N. W. 775 (1906); Mosher v. Cole, 50 Neb. 636,
70 N. W. 275 (1897) ; Hobby v. Freeman, 183 N. C. 240, 111 S. E. 1 (1922) ;
Marmaduke v. McDonald, 51 P. 2d 484 (Okla. 1935) ; Stover v. Davis, 57 W. Va.
196, 49 S. E. 1023 (1905).
" Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872) ; Johnson v. Szumowicz, 63 Wyo. 211,
179 P. 2d 1012 (1947) ; Sailor v. Hertzogg, 2 Barr 182 (Pa. 1845) ("The statute
protects the occupant, not for his merit, for he has none, but for the demerit of his
antagonist in delaying the contest beyond the period assigned for it, when papers
may be lost, facts forgotten, or witnesses dead.") See also 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY, § 1134 (3d Ed. 1939).
"' Kepley v. Scully, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N. E. 187 (1900) ; Bailey v. Moore and Munn,
21 Ill. 165 (1859) ; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa 89, 47 N. W.
905 (1891) ; Ellsworth v. Eslick, 91 Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973 (1914) ; Turner v.
Thomas, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 518 (1877); Hayes v. Boardman, 119 Mass. 414
(1876) ; Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339 (1864) ; Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 521
(1885) ; Brown v. Dorough, 224 S. W. 2d 752 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) ; Powell
Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W. 2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ; Louisiana & Texas
Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
1' Kepley v. Scully, 185 Ill. 52, 57 N. E. 187 (1900) (attornee induced attornment
and facts indicate that he had full knowledge of tenancy) ; Bailey v. Moore and
Munn, 21 Ill. 165 (1859) (attornee acquired title by sheriff's deed subsequent to
tenant's entry for landlord, court holding tenant could not attorn to one acquiring
a title hostile to that of landlord) ; Clifton Heights Land Co. v. Randell, 82 Iowa
89, 47 N. W. 905 (1891) (attornee aware of tenancy) ; Ellsworth v. Eslick, 91
Kan. 287, 137 Pac. 973 (1914) (no indication that owner was aware of tenancy) ;
Turner v. Thomas, 76 Ky. (13 Bush) 518 (1877) (attornment made as result of
inducement by attornee who claimed under tax deed held to be invalid) ; Hayes v.
Boardman, 119 Mass. 414 (1876) (no indication of whether attornee knew of
tenancy); Blanchard v. Tyler, 12 Mich. 339 (1864) (attornment by tenant to
party acquiring hostile title held of no effect. There attornee was advised by tenant
of his tenancy.) Farrar v. Heinrich, 86 Mo. 521 (1885) ; Louisiana & Texas Lum-
ber Co. v. Alexander, 154 S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913) (where the court,
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interrupt the running of the statute;13 and (3) that such an attornment
interrupts the running of the statute if the true owner had no notice of
the tenancy relationship.'
4
It would seem that the distinction recognized by this third group of
cases would tend to create an exception to the general rule that a tenant
is estopped to deny his landlord's title.' 5
This would seem to follow, for where there is no evidence that the
true owner has neglected his title or abandoned the property, and it
comes to his attention that the property is occupied by one who volun-
tarily takes a lease from him or acknowledges his paramount title, the
owner is not charged with more knowledge of the situation than could
be inferred from the very fact of the possession or ascertained by reason-
able inquiry.1
feeling that evidence was clear that plaintiff's agent was fully aware of the tenancy
relationship, said: "We are not prepared to say that this rule (that the continuity
of possession of an adverse'claimant is not broken by the attornment of his tenant
to another without his knowledge or consent) should apply where the attornment
is to the owner of the property and is obtained without any notice that the person
in possession, who makes the attornment, is holding under one claiming adversely
to him. In order to perfect his title by limitation, the adverse claimant of land
must give continuous notice of his claim by a visible occupancy and appropriation
of the land for the time prescribed by statute. He must in this way keep his flag
continuously flying; and while he may do this by tenant, if such tenant lowers the
flag by attorning to the owner, who acts in good faith and without notice that the
person in possession who attorns to him, is the tenant of the adverse claimant, it
may be that such attornment would break the continuity of the adverse claimant's
possession. It would seem that in such case the owner has done all that could be
required of him to protect his possession, and that the adverse claimant, who trusted
his tenant to assert his claim for him, should suffer the consequences of his agent's
infidelity."); Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W. 2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
(citing and quoting with approval Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander,
this note supra).
"3 Western Union Beef Co. v. Thurman, 70 Fed. 960 (5th Cir. 1895) ; Kaempfer
v. Zeller, 28 F. Supp. 699 (W. D. La. 1938) ; Van Deventer v. Lott, 172 Fed. 574
(E. D. N. Y. 1909), aff'd. 180 Fed. 378 (2d Cir. 1910) ; Russell v. Erwin's Admr.,
38 Ala. 44 (1861) ; De Forest v. Walters, 47 N. E. 297 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1897) ;
Koons v. Steele, 19 Pa. St. 203 (1852) ; Frank C. Schilling Co. v. Detry, 203 Wis.
109, 233 S. W. 635 (1930).
"4 Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872); Turpin v. Saunders, 32 Grat. 27
(Va. 1879) (the court said: "It is but fair to presume that if Cecil had been in-
formed that Simpkins was Saunders' tenant, he would at once have taken necessary
steps to protect his own rights.") But cf. Powell Lumber Co. v. Nobles, 44 S. W.
2d 774 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Louisiana & Texas Lumber Co. v. Alexander, 154
S. W. 233 (Tex. Civ. App. 1913).
" Such a distinction is suggested in 4 TIFFANY, REAL PRoPzavR, § 1168 (3d ed.
1939) (". . . in a few cases it has been decided that it (tenant's acknowledgment
of true owner's title) causes such interruption if the rightful owner does not know
of the relation of tenancy. These latter cases would seem to indicate the proper
distinction in this regard. If the rightful owner has no reason to suspect that the
person wrongfully in possession of his land is so in possession, not in his own behalf,
but in behalf of another, he is justified in assuming that the person in possession
has full power to characterize his possession as being hostile or the reverse, and if
such person acknowledges the true owner's title, the latter is not guilty of laches
in failing to take legal proceedings."). See also, 2 C. J. S., Adverse Possession,
§159 (1936).
" See, E.g., Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 23 S. E. 233 (1895), where the court
said: "No one is required to watch the clerk's office to see that those in possession
[Vol. 32
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The situation in the principal case has not come before the North
Carolina courts. However, the North Carolina court has consistently
held that a tenant cannot deny his landlord's title.' 7 Further, in Wise v.
Wheeler,"' the court held as inadmissible in evidence the testimony of a
tenant against his landlord in an action for possession instituted against
the tenant where the landlord was substituted as defendant. In the case
of Lawrence v. Eller,9 the court, by way of dictum, said: "It has been
said that the estoppel referred to does not prevail in actions involving
an issue as to title, but if such a limitation on the general rule prevails
in this jurisdiction, it applies only to actions involving strictly the issue
as to title, and does not extend to those where the possession and the
right growing out of or incident to it are presented or in any way
affected."
2 0
Where the true owner evidences his ownership by giving a lease to
the only person he knows to be holding without authority from him and
has no notice that the tenant is holding in behalf of another claiming
adversely to the owner, it would seem that justice and a fair interpreta-
tion of the law would not deprive the owner of his title.
2 1
The view, expressed by the dissenting opinion in the principal case,
22
that an attornment to the true owner by the tenant of an adverse pos-
sessor, where the true owner has no notice of the tenancy relationship,
interrupts the running of the statute in favor of the adverse possessor,
seems practical and just. If the true owner is aware of the tenancy
of property in privity with him or in subordination to his title are not (sic) acquir-
ing rights adverse to him," and Thompson v. Pioche, 44 Cal. 508 (1872), where, to
the contention that the possession of the tenant was notice of the title of his land-
lord, the court replied that such possession was not of itself notice, but that it was
sufficient to put a person dealing with the property upon inquiry and that it would
be proof of notice, unless it be shown that the inquiry, after having been pursued
with due diligence, did not disclose the title of the person in possession.
"7 Lassiter v. Stell, 214 N. C. 391, 199 S. E. 409 (1938) ; Prudential Ins. Co.
of Am. v. Totten, 203 N. C. 431, 166 S. E. 316 (1932) ; Hobby v. Freeman, 183
N. C. 240, 111 S. E. 1 (1922); Lawrence v. Eller, 169 N. C. 211, 85 S. E. 291
(1915) ; State v. Howell, 107 N. C. 835, 12 S. E. 569 (1890) ; Springs v. Schenck,
99 N. C. 551, 6 S. E. 405 (1888) ; Clapp v. Coble, 21 N. C. 177 (1835) ; Belfour's
Heirs v. Davis, 20 N. C. 443 (1839).
's28 N. C. 196 (1845). See also STANSBURy ON EVIDENCE, § 175 (1946)
("Statements by a devisee are not competent as admissions against other devisees
since their interests are not joint .... and the same is true of admissions of a tenant
offered against his landlord.")169 N. C. 211, 85 S. E. 291 (1915).
2' Lawrence v. Eller, 169 N. C. 211, 215, 85 S. E. 291, 292 (1915). See also
Prud. Ins. Co. of Am. v. Totten, 203 N. C. 431, 166 S. E. 316 (1932)."1 Note, 5 ALA. L. REv. 123 (1952), where the writer in commenting on Kimble
v. Willey, 198 F. 2d 812 (8th Cir. 1952) said: "In the instant case, the tenant, in
effect perpetrated a fraud on each of the principal parties. The rule here laid
down is intended to protect the record owner as against the adverse possessor where
the equities of the parties are substantially equal. Had the plaintiff had any actual
notice of the presence of an adverse claimant, and then failed to act on such notice,
the adverse claimant would have properly prevailed."
2 Kimble v. Willey, 204 F. 2d 238, 243 (8th Cir. 1953).
19531
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
relationship, his failure to resort to legal process to protect his title is
sufficient to indicate his acquiescence in the adverse possession. The
fact that he gives the tenant a lease when unaware of any other tenancy
relationship, rather than resort to legal process, should not operate to
deprive him of his legal title. To allow this result would seem to give
an unfair supremacy to the relationship of landlord and tenant to the
detriment of the holder of the legal title and would seem to be contrary
to the purpose and reason for statutes allowing the acquisition of title to
property by adverse possession.
NAOMI E. MORRIS
Constitutional Law-Due Process-Admissibility of Confessions
The decision in the "Reader's Digest Murder Case,"' recently handed
down by the United States Supreme Court, presents quite a dilemma
to state courts in their determination of the admissibility of confessions.
In a line of decisions beginning at least as early as 1936,2 the Supreme
Court has set aside as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment convictions in which "third degree" methods were
used to extract confessions from the accused.
3
The common law principle of exclusion of involuntary confessions
rested on the theory that they were untrustworthy testimony; that the
accused may have given an untrue confession to avoid or end present
pain and coercion. 4 A new test of what constitutes an involuntary con-
fession has evolved in the last decade and, until the decision in the
principal case, appeared to be becoming an established principle of con-
stitutional law. While this test is not enunciated in any case as a uniform
' Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077 (1953). The case rose to the Supreme
Court on writ of certiorari after the Court of Appeals of New York affirmed con-
viction. 303 N. Y. 856, 104 N. E. 2d 917 (1952).
'Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Involuntary confessions were
excluded by federal courts on the ground that they were in violation of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination as far back as the leading case of
Brai v. United States, 168 U. S. 532 (1897). Judicial thinking tended then to
consider involuntary confessions only in the light of the self-incrimination clause
of the Fifth Amendment which, of course, was inapplicable to the states. But as
Chief Justice Hughes said in Brown v. Mississippi: "Compulsion by torture to ex-
tort a confession is a different matter. The state is free to regulate the procedure
of its courts in accordance with its own conceptions of policy, unless in so doing it
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental.. . . The freedom of the state in establishing
its policy is the freedom of constitutional government and is limited by the require-
ment of due process of law." 297 U. S. 278, 285 (1936).
'Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227 (1940) ; White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530
(1940) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Watts v. Indiana, 338
U. S. 49 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U. S. 62 (1949) ; Harris v. South
Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949) ; Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881 (1951) (per
curiam).
'3 WiGcoR, EVIDENCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940).
[Vol. 32
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standard, formulated as is a "prescription in pharmacopoeia," 5 the prin-
ciple relied upon is that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment proscribes the use against an accused of a confession which
was extorted from him by inflicting physical6 or mental pain, regardless
of the reliability of the confession.8 But as pointed out in a note in this
Law Review,9 the test rests upon but a handful of opinions, and in all
of the cases having full opinions there were strong dissents. Four of
the cases were five-four decisions,'0 while two others were six-three
decisions." The permanence of the test became uncertain when, in the
summer of 1949, death took two justices who had consistently sided with
the majority, Justices Murphy and Rutledge. While three other cases
12
have considered the problem of involuntry confessions and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment since the Watts, Turner,
and Harris decisions were handed down in June of 1949, it was not until
Stein v. New York that the tenuous constitutional rule was questioned
by the majority of the court.
In the principal case, petitioners Stein, Cooper, and Wissner were
convicted and sentenced to death for the felony murder' 3 of the com-
panion of the driver of a Reader's Digest delivery truck, which petitioners
robbed. Police had arrested petitioners after two months of investigation
and had carried them separately and at different times to police barracks,
where they were illegally held incommunicado and interrogated for
periods of two to four days. Stein and Cooper made confessions, which
they contended were extorted from them by force, but Wissner remained
' Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 417 (1945) (concurring opinion of
Frankfurter, J.).
' Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
"Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949).
O Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
'Note, 28 N. C. L. RZv. 393 (1950).
10 Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U. S. 68 (1949) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U. S. 62 (1949) ; Haley v. Ohio, 322 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski v. New York, 324
U. S. 401 (1945).
"1Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143
(1944).
1 Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) (conviction affirmed; record
showed no evidence of coercion; in fact, it appeared that defendant was anxious to
confess, although he claimed he was slapped once by arresting officer) ; Gallegos v.
Nebraska, 342 U. S. 55 (1951) (conviction affirmed; no evidence to show coercion,
although the confessions were obtained during a period of 25 days of illegal deten-
tion by federal and state officers before accused was brought before a magistrate and
before counsel was appointed. While McNabb v. United States, 318 U. S. 332
[1942] proscribes the use in federal courts of evidence obtained by federal officers
during illegal detention, the McNabb rule is not a limitation imposed by the Due
Process Clause on the state courts. Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 [1944]) ;
Johnson v. Pennsylvania, 340 U. S. 881 (1951) (per curiam; reversed on the basis
of Turner v. Pennsylvania).
" A homicide committed by a person engaged in the commission of a felony.
It is first-degree murder and carries a mandatory death sentence unless the jury
recommends life imprisonment. N. Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1044(2), 1045, 1045-a (Mc-
Kinney, 1944).
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silent. After this period of custody, they were examined by the prison
doctor who later testified that the petitioners had various bruises and
abrasions about the body. 14 The examining physician also testified that
the injuries "could have been" sustained prior to arrest.'5
When the confessions were offered in evidence at the trial, the de-
fendants objected to their introduction on the grounds that they had been
obtained through coercion. The trial court heard evidence in the pres-
ence of the jury as to the issue of coercion and left determination of the
issue to the jury. While this New York practice'0 of letting the con-
fession go to the jury to -determine its voluntariness is contrary to the
general rule that admissibility of a confession is a question of law for
the court,' 7 the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid jury trial of the
issue.' 8 Petitioners did not take the stand,'0 and the issue of coercion
rested on charges of their counsel and the circumstantial evidence of
multiple bruises and injuries on petitioners' bodies the day after arraign-
ment. The jury was instructed to consider the confessions only if it
found them to have been voluntarily made. A general verdict of guilty
was rendered by the jury.
As the Supreme Court points out, "under these circumstances, we
cannot be sure whether the jury found the defendants guilty by accepting
and relying, at least in part, upon the confessions or whether it rejected
the confessions and found them guilty on other evidence."'20  The court
therefore held that the jury could properly have found the confessions
not to have been obtained by physical force or threats or psychological
14 "Testimony by the prison doctor who examined them predicated mainly on the
notes he made at the time was that Wissner had a broken rib and various bruises
and abrasions on the side, legs, stomach and buttocks; Cooper had bruises on the
chest, stomach, right arm, and both buttocks; Stein had a bruise on his right arm."
Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1083 (1953).
" Id. at 1085, note 11. The doctor testified that it was difficult to state exactly
how long the bruises had been there; that the bruises on Cooper's body could
have been there as long as six days (he had been in custody three days) ; and that
Stein's bruises could have been sustained prior to arrest. Ibid.
1' The trial judge must exclude the confession if he is convinced that it was not
freely made, or that the verdict that it was freely made would be against the weight
of evidence, but if the issue of voluntariness presents a fair question of fact, he
must receive the confession and leave to the jury, under proper instructions, the
ultimate determination of its voluntary character and truthfulness. N. Y. CODE
CRIM. PROc § 395 (McKinney, 1945).
1' 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 861 (3d ed. 1940). This rule is well recognized by
the majority of jurisdictions, including the federal courts and 30 states, all of
which are surveyed by Dean Wigmore. North Carolina is in accord with the
majority rule. State v. Manning, 221 N. C. 70, 18 S. E. 2d 821 (1942)." Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
9 Under New York law, if defendants had taken the witness stand to support
the charges that the police had obtained the confession by coercion, they could have
been subjected to general cross-examination. See People v. Trybus, 219 N. Y. 18,
113 N. E. 538 (1916). As the court points out, if they had testified, undoubtedly
their previous criminal records would have been put in evidence, and by refusing
to testify those records were not brought to the attention of the jury."0 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1085 (1953).
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coercion, and that if the jury so resolved that the confessions were ad-
missible, it would not have been constitutional error.21 If the jury had
rejected the confession as involuntary, however, the court held that the
jury could constitutionally have based a conviction upon other sufficient
evidence. The court thus resolved its own dilemma by finding that it
was neither error if the jury admitted and relied on the confession, nor
was it error if they rejected it and convicted on other evidence.
2 2
To this holding, Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Douglas filed vigor-
ous dissents. justice Black declared, "beginning at least as early as
Chambers v. Florida [1940], this court has set aside state convictions
as violative of due process when based on confessions extracted by state
police while suspects were held incommunicado. That line of cases is
greatly weakened if not repudiated by today's sanction of the arbitrary
seizure and secret questioning of the defendants here. State police wish-
ing to seize and hold people incommunicado are now given a green
light. '23 Justice Frankfurter in his dissent said "the court goes beyond
a mere evaluation of the facts of this record. It makes a needlessly
broad ruling of law which overturns what I had assumed was a settled
principle of constitutional law." 24  He adds that "it is painful to be
compelled to say that the court is taking a retrogressive step in the
administration of criminal justice. I can only hope that it is a tempo-
rary, perhaps an ad hoc, deviation from a long course of decisions."
25
Justice Douglas echoes the alarm of the other dissenters and cites a body
of opinion26 against the decision of the majority.27  While the court had
2 The court was impressed by the evidence that Stein and Cooper confessed after
"only" 12 hours of intermittent questioning stretched over a 32-hour period, and
that Cooper spent much of that time "driving a bargain" with police and parole
officers that if he confessed, his brother would not be prosecuted for parole viola-
tion. Id. at 1093.
" The court also held that even if the confessions of Stein and Cooper were
considered to have been involuntary, their use would not have violated any federal
right of Wissner, who did not confess but was implicated by those who did. As
for Wissner's contention that his rights were infringed because he was unable to
cross-examine accusing witnesses (the confessors, who did not take the stand), the
court held that there is no right of confrontation under the Fourteenth Amendment,
citing as authority West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258 (1904), in which it was decided
that the Federal Constitution did not preclude Louisiana from using affidavits on a
criminal trial. As Justice Black points out in his dissent however, a later case,
It re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), reversed a conviction, inter alia, because the
defendant was denied reasonable notice of the charge against him and the right to
confront witnesses against him. Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1099 (1953).
.2 Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1099 (1953).
21 Id. at 1100.
- 2Ibid.
26 Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181 (1952) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S.
55 (1951) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S.
401 (1945) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944).
2' Douglas also contends in his dissent that in all of the cases in which the court
has dealt with the practice of discrimination against Negroes in the selection of
juries as violative of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, from Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (1880) down to Avery v. Georgia, 73 Sup. Ct. 891 (1953),
the determinative question was whether a constitutional right had been violated,
1953]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
characterized these rulings as dicta, Douglas points out that Malinski v.
New York was a square holding that if the admitted confession were
found to be coerced a subsequent conviction would be set aside, even
though the evidence apart from the confession might have been sufficient
to sustain the jury's verdict,28 and that the conviction in Malinski was
reversed, even though other evidence might have supported the verdict.
2D
The holding in the Malinski case followed language in other cases 0
similar to that used by Justice Roberts in Lisenba v. California: "The
aim of the requirement of due process is not to exclude presumptively
false evidence, but to prevent fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence whether true or false."3'
The ruling in Stein v. New York that the jury could reject the con-
fessions as involuntary and still base a conviction on other sufficient
evidence, appears then to be a retreat from the precedent of the Supreme
Court itself. It is interesting to note that Justices Douglas, Frankfurter,
and Black, now dissenters, were with the majority in the Ashcraft,
Malinski, Haley, Watts, Harris, and Turner decisions; while Justice
Jackson, who here writes the majority opinion, was dissenting along
with Justices Reed and Burton and Chief Justice Vinson in those cases.
The new Justices, Clark and Minton, take the majority view in the
instant case. As Douglas states, "from the undisputed facts it seems
clear that these confessions would be condemned if the constitutional
school of thought when Haley v. Ohio,3 2 Watts v. Indiana,83 Turner v.
and not if there were other sufficient evidence to convict. In the Avery case, the
court said if the jury commissioners failed in their duty to use a non-discriminatory
method of selecting a jury, the conviction must be reversed, "no matter how strong
the evidence of guilt." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1103 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion of Douglas, J.).
2' "If all the attendant circumstances indicate that the confession was coerced
or compelled, it may not be used to convict a defendant. And if it is introduced at
the trial, the judgment of conviction will be set aside even though the evidence
apart from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict."
Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945).
29 The court recognizes that it cannot characterize the Malinski case as dictum,
and expressly says that "except for the Malinski case the question raised here
could not have been raised or decided." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1095
(1953). Without overruling or distinguishing the Malinski decision, the court
states that against the factual background of its other decisions which it had called
dicta, "we do not think our cases establish that to submit a confession to a state
jury for judgment of the coercion issue automatically disqualifies it from finding a
conviction on other sufficient evidence, if it rejects the confession." Id. at 1095.
" "If the confession which petitioner made in the District Attorney's office was
in fact involuntary, the conviction cannot stand, even though the evidence apart
from the confession might have been sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict." Stroble
v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952). "The use of any confession obtained in
violation of due process requires the reversal of a conviction even though unchal-
lenged evidence, adequate to convict remains." Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U. S.
55, 63 (1951). "A coerced confession is inadmissible under the Due Process Clause
even though statements in it may independently be established as true." Watts v.
Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, note 2 (1949).
"314 U. S. 219, 236 (1941). 332 U. S. 596 (1948).
"338 U. S. 49 (1949).
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Pennsylvania,3 4 and Harris v. South Carolina&5 were -decided still was
the dominant one."3 6  Those cases indicated that the Supreme Court
had directed a "mandate" to the state courts3 7 that confessions be ad-
mitted only when free from any physical or psychological coercion.
This was hailed by many as a salutary development in constitutional
law and criminal procedure,38 and a trend in the direction of the English
law, which is particularly sensitive to police abuses of the rights of the
accused.39  Certainly, it demonstrated that much had been accomplished
since 1931, when the Wickersham Commission reported that the extor-
tion of confessions by the police by mental or physical pressure was wide-
spread in this country,40 but that such methods still exist is shown by
the cases which continue to appear. A survey of the methods that have
been used to extort confessions tends to indicate that it has gradually
taken a reduced showing of coercion to result in a finding by the Su-
preme Court of a violation of due process.
41
"338 U. S. 62 (1949).
"338 U. S. 68 (1949).
Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1104 (1953).
' "It is sufficient to here say that we have reached the conclusion that the instant
confession was obtained under circumstances such as to constitute its use in evidence
a denial of due process, under the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United
States. Having so concluded, it is our duty to follow what we understand to be the
mandate of that court. Prince v. Texas, 155 Tex. Cr. R. 108, 111, 231 S. W. 2d
419, 421 (1950).
'8 Note, 28 N. C. L. REv. 390 (1950).
" "Questioning of persons in custody; xlvii: a rigid instruction should be issued
to the police that no questioning of a prisoner, or a person in custody, about any
crime with which he is, or may be charged, should be permitted. (1) If a prisoner
expresses a wish to make a voluntary statement, he should be cautioned, offered
writing materials and left to write without being overlooked, questioned or
prompted." Only obvious ambiguities in prisoner's statements may be cleared up
by questions, which prisoner shall be free to answer or refuse to answer without
any coaxing or pressure by the police. Royal Commission on Police Powers and
Procedure, Cmd. no. 3297, at 144, as quoted in 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 847 (3rd
ed. 1940).
" Reported in National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement, Re-
port No. 11, Lawlessness in Law Enforcement 153 (1931).
"Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936) (confession obtained after ac-
cused was taken by a deputy and a mob to the woods, severely beaten and a noose
placed around his neck; conviction reversed) ; Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 277
(1940) (defendants jailed in atmosphere of mob violence, subjected to five days
and nights of interrogation before they "broke" and confessed; conviction re-
versed) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U. S. 143 (1944) (accused subjected to 36
hours of continuous questioning, during which time he was denied food and sleep;
conviction reversed); Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U. S. 596 (1944) (accused was
subjected to 16 days of intermittent questioning and had a pan of human bones
placed before him in order to obtain a confession; conviction affirmed, as a later
confession was determined voluntary) ; Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401 (1945)
(defendant was arrested, stripped, and held incommunicado in order to coerce a
confession; conviction reversed) ; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U. S. 596 (1948) (a fifteen-
year-old Negro boy was interrogated from midnight until 5 a.m. and not permitted
to see friends or counsel and a confession was obtained; conviction reversed);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49 (1949) (accused was interrogated intermittently for
six days, during which time he was not given adequate opportunities for sleep or
a decent allowance of food; conviction reversed); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338
U. S. 62 (1949) (accused was interrogated by relays of officers from four to six
1953]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
But throughout these decisions there have been strong dissents, a
major theme being that the Supreme Court was interfering with the
states in their administration of criminal justice.42 The alarm that
Jackson once expressed in his dissents over this "encroaching federal
power" over state courts is now embodied in the majority opinion of
the principal case. 43 The court feels that the state courts may be abdi-
cating their primary responsibilty of determining the admissibility of
confessions under their own rules, and that the conscience of the local
administration of justice may become subordinated to a federal Supreme
Court exercizing its conscience over the details of state police pro-
cedure.
44
Thus the court, rather than deciding whether the confessions by
petitioners in the instant case were voluntary, holds that the jury could
have 'determined the issue either way and their verdict would be given
hours a day for five days; conviction reversed); Harris v. South Carolina, 338
U. S. 68 (1949) (defendant was questioned intermittently for three days; convic-
tion reversed).
" The typical dissent was that expressed by Justice Jackson in Ashcraft v. Ten-
nessee, 322 U. S. 143, 174 (1944) : "The use of the Due Process Clause to disable
the states in protection of society from crime is quite as dangerous and delicate a
use of federal judicial power as to use it to disable them from social or economic
experimentation."
The majority view of this line of cases is well stated by Justice Frankfurter in
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U. S. 49, 50, 53-55 (1949) : "Although the Constitution puts
protection against crime predominantly in the keeping of the states, the Fourteenth
Amendment severely restricted the states in their administration of criminal jus-
tice.... On review here of state convictions, all those matters which are usually
termed issues of fact are for conclusive determination by the state courts and are
not open for reconsideration by this court.... But issue of fact is a coat of many
colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted happening,
when that conclusion incorporated standards of conduct or criteria for judgment
which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights. . . . If force has been
applied [to secure a confession], this court does not leave to local determination
whether or not the confession was voluntary. There is torture of mind as well as
body; the will is as much affected by fear as force. . . . A confession by which
life becomes forfeit must be the expression of free choice .... If it is the product
of sustained pressure by the police it does not issue from a free choice .... Even-
tual yielding to questioning under such circumstances is plainly the product of the
suction process of interrogation and therefore the reverse of voluntary .... Under
our system society carries the burden of proving its charge against the accused not
out of his own mouth. . . . In holding that the Due Process Clause bars police
procedure which violates the basic notions of our accusatorial mode of prosecuting
crime and vitiates a confession based on the fruits of such procedure, we apply the
Due Process Clause to its historic function of assuring appropriate procedure before
liberty is curtailed or life is taken. We are deeply mindful of the anguishing prob-
lems which the incidence of crime presents to the states. But the history of crimi-
nal law proves overwhelmingly that brutal methods of law enforcement are essen-
tially self-defeating, whatever may be their effect in a particular case."
"3 "Petitioner's argument here is essentially that the conclusion of the New York
judges and jurors are mistaken and that by reweighing the same evidence, we, as
a superjury, should find the confessions were coerced. This misapprehends our
function and scope of review, a misconception which must be shared by some state
courts with the result that they feel a diminished sense of responsibility for pro-
tecting defendants in confession cases." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1090
(1953).
"Note, 28 N. C. L. Ray. 390 (1950).
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"decisive respect. ' 45  But the court does not expressly overrule its pre-
vious holdings, for it further declares:
Of course, this court cannot allow itself to be completely bound
by state court determination of any issue essential to decision of a
claim of federal right, else federal law could be frustrated by dis-
torted fact finding. It is only miscarriages of such gravity and
magnitude that they cannot be expected to happen in an enlight-
ened system of justice, or be tolerated by it if they do, that cause
us to intervene to review in the name of the Federal Constitution,
the weight of conflicting evidence to support a decision by a state
court.
46
This language has more of a familiar ring; it is found in previous
cases which declare that the securing of a confession through the "denial
of due process is the failure to observe that fundamental fairness essen-
tial to the principles of liberty and justice, '47 and that the absence of
such fairness "fatally infected the trial. '48  Perhaps this indicates that
the court is not abandoning but just contracting the radius of the pro-
tection of due process to cover only those instances in which extreme
abuses by the police are employed to obtain confessions, or where the
Supreme Court thinks there is insufficient evidence to convict without
the use of the confession. Despite the concern of the dissent,49 there are
no indications that the decision is a return to the old trustworthiness test,
long since buried by newer constitutional principles. 50 How retrogres-
sive a step this case represents will be shown only by future decisions of
the court. But until a more definitive opinion is handed down, state
courts will face the problem of whether they can permit a conviction on
the basis of other sufficient evidence when the question of the voluntari-
ness of the confession goes to the jury.5
" Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1090 (1953).
"'Id. at 1091.
47 Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
"Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219 (1941).
"Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1104 (1953) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
" Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
" The language used by the court indicates that it will reverse in the future only
when extreme abuses are found in the securing of the confession or when there
is not other sufficient evidence to convict, regardless of whether the confession is
determined voluntary by the jury or the judge. The court states, "of course, where
the judge makes a final determination that a confession is admissible and sends it to
the jury as a part of the evidence to be considered on the issue of guilt and the
ruling admitting the confession is found on review to be erroneous, the conviction,
at least normally, should fall with the confession." Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct.
1077, 1096 (1953). Despite this statement, the whole tenor of the decision is that
it will take a showing of extreme coercion before the Supreme Court will reverse a
state court finding of guilt, irrespective of who determines the voluntariness of the
confession. Not only are those jurisdictions in which the question is one of fact
for the jury facing a dilemma in resolving the problem of admissibility of confes-
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Due process as secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is very flex-
ible, and can be enlarged or contracted according to the policy of the
Supreme Court at a given time. Confessions cannot always be tested to
fit a Procrustean bed, but must be measured in the light of a flexible due
process requirement that state courts observe that fundamental fairness
essential to the protection of the accused by refusing to use a confession
obtained by physical or psychological coercion. It is to be hoped that
we are not entering upon "a new regime of constitutional law, '5 2 in
which the rights of the accused are valued less highly than is the efficient
functioning of the machinery for the administration of justice, but rather
that a resilient Due Process Clause will reassert in succeeding cases the
principles that nearly a generation of decisions has evolved.
JAmEs ALBERT HousE, JR.
Constitutional Law-Racial Restrictive Covenants-Recovery of
Damages for Breach
Since 1948 when the Supreme Court held that racial restrictive
covenants could not be specifically enforced by injunction in state or
federal courts,1 legal writers have speculated2 and the courts have dis-
agreed3 on the recovery of damages. Now the Supreme Court in Bar-
rows v. Jackso 4 has settled the issue by holding the award of damages
by a state court for the breach of racial restrictive covenants to be state
sions under the Due Process Clause, but also facing the same problem are those
jurisdictions in which the voluntariness of the confession is a question of law for
the court. The latter must decide whether a conviction now must be reversed when
the trial judge admits a confession which may have been involuntary, but there is,
however, other sufficient evidence on which the jury could have found the accused
guilty. And just how much coercion the Supreme Court is now likely to say is of"such gravity and magnitude" to require a reversal is an unknown measure and a
problem facing all jurisdictions.
" Stein v. New York, 73 Sup. Ct. 1077, 1102 (1953) (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.).
' Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) (state courts) ; Hurd v. Hodge, 334
U. S. 24 (1948) (federal courts) (discussed in Notes, 27 N. C. L. REV. 224 (1949),
28 N. C. L. REv. 442 [1950]).
"Barnett, Race Restrictive Covenants Restricted, 28 OR. L. REV. 1 (1948)
Crooks, The Racial Covenant Cases, 37 GFo. L. J. 514 (1949) ; Groves, Judicial
Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme Court in the Restric-
tive Covenant Cases, 45 ILL. L. REV. 614 (1950); Heard, Race and Residence:
The Current Status of Racial Restrictive Covenants, 1 BAYLOR L. Rav. 20 (1948) ;
Howell, Recent Developments in the Law of Racial Restrictions on Real Property,
1 INTRA L. REv. OF ST. Louis 222 (1951) ; Kiang, Judicial Enforcement of Re-
strictive Covenants in the United States, 24 WAsH. L. REV. 1 (1949) ; Lowe, Racial
Restrictive Covenants, 1 ALA. L. REv. 15 (1948) ; Ming, Racial Restrictions and
the Fourteenth Amendment: the Restrictive Covenant Cases, 16 U. OF CHi. L. Ray.
203 (1949) ; Scanlan, Race Restrictions in Real Estate-Property Values v. Hunan
Values, 24 NoTRE DAIE LAW. 157 (1948).
See notes 10 and 11 infra.
'73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 97 L. Ed. (Adv. p. 961) (1953).
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action in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, in that it deprives
racial minorities of the equal protection of the laws. 5
The principal case involved an agreement between adjoining land
owners in Los Angeles, each of whom covenanted that no part of his
real property should "be used or occupied by any person or persons not
wholly of the white or Caucasian race." 6  Upon the sale by defendant
to a non-Caucasian in 1950, plaintiffs instituted an action at law for
damages against the seller. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County
sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint. On appeal to the
District Court of Appeal, it was held that
a state may not by judicial process enforce private rights
derived from consensual agreements of private individuals, where
to do so would result in the infringement of civil liberties guar-
anteed by the Constitution of the United States;
therefore the demurrer was properly sustained.7 In interpreting and
extending the rule of the Shelley case, the California Court further
stated: "The coercive device of retribution in the form of damages is as
effective as the coercive effect of injunctive relief, although not as im-
mediate."8
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court held:
(1) A state court in awarding damages for breach of a racial
restrictive covenant is taking state action under the Four-
teenth Amendment, and is acting in violation of the equal
protection clause.
(2) A person defending the breach of a racial restrictive covenant
may rely on the denial of constitutional rights of a racial
minority group, although no member of the group is before
the court.9
Until the Shelley case, it was assumed that damages could be recovered for the
breach of racial restrictive covenants. Eason v. Buffaloe, 198 N. C. 520, 152 S. E.
496 (1930).
'Barrows v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1032 (1953).
Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, _ 247 P. 2d 99, 103 (1952). The
Supreme Court of California denied petition for hearing on October 2, 1952. The
California decision in the Barrows case is discussed in Notes, 38 CORNELL L. Q.
236 (1953), 4 HASTINGs L. J. 57 (1952), 37 MINN. L. Ray. 65 (1952), 25 RoCKY
MT. L. Rav. 112 (1952), 26 Sou. CALJF. L. REv. 201 (1953), 26 TEmPLE L. Q. 320
(1953).
' Barrows v. Jackson, 112 Cal. App. 2d 534, 247 P. 2d 99, 112 (1952).
'The late Mr. Chief Justice Vinson dissented on this point, saying in part: "The
majority identifies no non-Caucasian who has been injured or could be injured if
damages are assessed against respondent for breaching the promise which she
willingly and voluntarily made to petitioners .... Because I cannot see how re-
spondent can avail herself of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of total strangers-
the only rights which she has chosen to assert-and since I cannot see how the
Court can find that those rights would be impaired in this particular case by re-
quiring respondent to pay petitioners for the injury which she recognizes she has
brought upon them, I am unwilling to join the Court in today's decision." Barrows
v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1038, 1041 (1953).
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(3) The refusal of a state court to enforce such covenants does
not violate the constitutional guaranty against impairing the
obligation of a contract, because that guaranty is only directed
against legislative action.
(4) Plaintiffs are not themselves denied due process and equal
protection by a refusal to enforce the covenants, because no
one can demand state action which would result in a denial
of equal protection of the laws to other individuals.
Before Barrows v. Jackson and after Shelley v. Kraemer, four courts
had dealt with the problem of awarding damages in this type case; two
granted damages' 0 and two denied recovery." Clearly, as a result of
the Barrows decision, state courts and probably federal courts cannot
enforce racial restrictive covenants in any form of action.12  The cove-
nants themselves have not been held to be invalid; rather they are merely
unenforceable in the courts. 13 However, this 'decision does not preclude
a later holding that racial restrictive covenants are void because opposed
to the express public policy of the United States as set forth in the Civil
Rights Act 14 and in the Charter of the United Nations.1' The courts
have thus far either rejected'0 or ignored17 contentions that the cove-
1" Correll v. Earley, 205 Okla. 366, 237 P. 2d 1017 (1949) (where damages were
granted in a suit against the original covenantor, an intermediate vendor, and the
non-Caucasian vendee for a conspiracy to violate the covenant) ; Weiss v. Laeon,
359 Mo. 1054, 225 S. W. 2d 127 (1949). These decisions were criticized in Notes,
3 ALA. L. REv. 379 (1951), 4 ALA. L. REv. 289 (1952), 63 HARV. L. Rnv. 1062
(1950), 28 N. C. L. REv. 442 (1950), 13 U. PITrSBURGH L. REv. 647 (1952), 24
RocKY MT. L. Rav. 380 (1952), 38 VA. L. REv. 389 (1952).
"' Roberts v. Curtis, 93 F. Supp. 604 (D. C. D. C. 1950) ; Phillips v. Naff, 332
Mich. 389, 52 N. W. 2d 158 (1952).
- These cases on the Fourteenth Amendment apply to all minority groups, al-
though the cases have usually arisen in suits by Negroes. Amer v. Superior Court
of California, 334 U. S. 813 (1948) ; Yin Kim v. Superior Court of California 334
U. S. 813 (1948) ; Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 33 (1905)." Barrows v. Jackson, 73 Sup. Ct. 1031, 1033 (1953).
1414 STAT. 27 (1866), 8 U. S. C. § 42 (1946).
1 CHARTR OF THE UNITED NATIONS, Arts. 55"(c), 56 (1945).
The High Court of Ontario in Re Drummond Wren held racial restrictive
covenants were void because opposed to Canadian public policy. In ascertaining
that public policy, the court relied on the CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS and
the Atlantic Charter as well as Canadian Statutes. 4 D. L. R. 674 (1945) 0. R.
778. However a later decision by the Supreme Court of Canada ignored these pub-
lic policy considerations and held the covenants invalid as illegal restraints on
alienation. Re Noble and Wolf, 1 D. L. R. 321 (1951) S. C. R. 64 (discussed in
Comment, 29 CAN. BAR. Rav. 969 [1951]). Similarly, a California Court held that
restrictions under the Alien Land Law were invalid under the CHARTER OF THE
UNITED NATIONS; but on appeal, the Supreme Court of California held that the
UNITED NATIONS CHARTER was not self-executing and would not supercede incon-
sistent local laws, but that the restrictions violated the Fourteenth Amendment.
Fujii v. State. 97 Cal. App. 154, 217 P. 2d 481 (1950), aff'd on other grounds, 38
Cal. 2d 718, 242 P. 2d 617 (1952).
13 Judge Edgerton of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals vigorously
asserted that the covenants should be void in his dissenting opinion in Hurd v.
Hodge, 162 F. 2d 233, 235-246 (1947). But although the Supreme Court reversed




nants are void as opposed to public policy, but it is possible that the
decision in the segregation cases now pending before the Supreme Court
will strengthen public policy against racial discrimination.
The Shelley case stated that acts of the executive and legislative
branches of state governments are as much state action as are judicial
acts.18 The recognition and enforcement of discriminatory zoning ordi-
nances, passed and administered by county and municipal officials, has
been held to be unconstitutional state action.19 Whether the Barrows
case can be construed to bar purely administrative acts tending to effec-
tuate racial restrictions, such as the recordation of deeds containing dis-
criminatory covenants, is uncertain. The covenants are by recordation
given official recognition, which tacitly implies that state government
officials condone discriminatory practices, although they cannot posi-
tively enforce them. A possible analogy in reverse can be 'drawn be-
tween the function performed by a county registrar of deeds and that of
a county registrar for voting. The Supreme Court in the latter situa-
tion has held that a refusal to register qualified Negroes is state action
forbidden by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. 20  It would
appear that the language in the Shelley case is broad enough to preclude
the acts of administrative officers,2 1 should such acts be challenged on
the ground that they are acts of the state.
Yet so long as the covenants remain only "gentlemen's agreements"
and are not brought into court, they can under the Barrows decision
continue to flourish. The Court in Barrows v. Jackson very clearly
retained the principle established in Corrigan v. Buckley22 and restated
in Shelley v. Kraemer that "so long as the purposes of those agreements
are effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms, it would appear
clear that there has been no action by the state and the provisions of the
Amendment have not been violated."
23
However, the purposes of the covenants can (and undoubtedly will)
be effectuated by extra-legal means. One of the most effective methods
of discouraging prospective purchasers who are "undesirable" is by
"visits" from a neighborhood committee, which suggests that another
residential area might be found more congenial.2 4 In addition to social
18 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14 (1948).
1" Richmond v. Deans, 281 U. S. 704 (1930) ; Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S.
60 (1917) ; Clinard v. Winston-Salem, 217 N. C. 119, 6 S. E. 2d 867 (1940)..o Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1943) ; Byrd v. Brice, 104 F. Supp. 442
(1952); Dean v. Thomas, 93 F. Supp. 129 (1950).
" "The action of state courts and of judicial officers il; their official capacities
[italics added] is to be regarded as action of the state within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1, 14 (1948).
22 271 U. S. 323 (1926). 23 334 U. S. 1, 13 (1948).
"' For a description of some methods of social ostracism against Negroes who
move into white neighborhoods, and a catalogue of extra-legal devices used, see 14
PoPuLAR GovERNMENT (No. 6) 8, 11 (June 1948) (Institute of Government, Chapel
Hill, N. C.) ; Frank, The United States Supreme Court: 1947-1948, 16 U. CHi. L.
REv. 1, 21-28 (1948).
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pressure, the refusal of real estate agents even to show Negroes houses
in restricted residential areas, and the disinclination of banks to furnish
loans for such purchases will serve to retain the effect of the restrictions
for a long time to come.25 Other devices are the use of cash deposits,
neighborhood clubs or corporations, options to repurchase, land trusts,
and long-term leases.2 6  Only time, education, and the gradual disap-
pearance of emotional prejudices can bring to an end these devices.
LINDSAY TATE
Contracts-Inducing Breach-Intentional Interference with
Contractual Relations-Justification-Privilege
Plaintiff, a contract carrier, alleged that he had contracted with
various persons to carry them to and from Camp Lejeune, and that
defendant induced these named persons to break their contracts with
plaintiff and ride on defendant's bus instead. In sustaining an order
overruling a demurrer to this cause of action, the court affirmed the
general principle that a party may be held liable in damages for inducing
another to breach his contract.'
The principle of tort liability for inducing breach of contract is rela-
tively new. The first significant case, Lundey v. Gye 2 held that the
defendant's inducement of a famous singer to breach her contract to sing
at plaintiff's theater was actionable. 3 The principle was first recognized
in North Carolina in Haskins v. Royster4 where the defendant induced
a servant of plaintiff to breach his employment contract with the plain-
tiff,5 and was affirmed and extended in Jones v. StanlyO where the de-
" Scanlan, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 NoTmE DAME LAW. 157, 179
(1949).
2 These are discussed in detail by Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth
Amendment, 16 U. CHl. L. REv. 203, 216-221 (1949) ; Scanlan, Racial Restrictions
in Real Estate, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW. 147, 179-181 (1952) ; Notes, 1 INTRA L. REV.
(U. C. L. A.) 14, 16-18 (1952), 27 N. C. L. REv. 224, 229-234 (1949), 13 U. Pirrs-
BURGH L. 1Ev. 646, 661-665 (1952).
It seems obvious that some of the means formerly employed are now outlawed
by the Barrows decision. Declaratory judgments and advisory opinions by state
courts would be state action in violation of the Constitution. Also the inclusion of
racial restrictions as conditions in a fee simple determinable or a conditional fee is
probably now illegal, at least so far as enforcement is concerned. The effect of the
Barrows decision should be kept in mind when reading the articles cited throughout
this note.
Bryant v. Barber, 237 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 2d 410 (1953).
(1853) 2 Ell. & BI. 216.
'The chief significance of this case being a holding that the action would lie
even though the means used were not tortious to the singer, which had long been
a requisite. (Italics supplied.) See: Garret v. Taylor, (1621) Cro. Jac. (K. B.)
567.
'70 N. C. 601 (1874).
It is said that rights to the performance of a contract are property rights.
Second National Bank v. M. Samuel and Sons, 12 F. 2d 963 (2d Cir. 1926) ; Kock
v. Burgess, 167 Iowa 727, 149 N. W. 858 (1914) ; Winston v. Lumber Co., 227 N. C.
339, 42 S. E. 2d 218 (1947).
0 76 N. C. 355 (1877).
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fendant induced a railroad company to refuse to transport freight in
accordance with the terms of a contract between plaintiff and the railroad.
Intended interference with the contractual relations of another creates
a prima facie tort, and the burden of showing justification rests upon the
defendant. 7  To establish justification as a defense the 'defendant must
have been protecting an interest at least equal in value to the contract
rights of the plaintiff.8  It has been said that "The question of privilege
is of course as broad as the catalogue of possible interests involved.. .."9
In Bryant v. Barber,'0 the court applied the general rule that the privi-
lege of free competition does not justify intentional interference with
established contractual relations,"- refusing to recognize the defendant's
contention that he was merely engaging in "legal competition.'1 2 Efforts
to eliminate business competitors, besides incurring criminal liability,'
3
are actionable if they interfere with contractual relations. Thus, where
plaintiff had patented an attachment for hosiery machines and had as-
signed a one-fourth interest to the 'defendants, it was held to be an
actionable wrong for the defendants to interfere with plaintiff's contract
with another party to use the attachment on a partnership basis.' 4 Fur-
thermore, the privilege of free competition will not justify inducing
breach of a non-competitive agreement. In Sineath v. Katzis,15 where
plaintiff bought a laundry and dry-cleaning establishment, including the
previous owner's goodwill, and where part of the consideration for the
purchase price was an agreement with the former owner not to compete
anywhere in the county for 15 years, and where it was shown to the
court's satisfaction that the defendant had induced the former owner
to assist her in establishing and running a dry-cleaning establishment
"Connors v. Connolly et al., 86 Conn. 641, 86 Atl. 600 (1913) ; Berry v. Dono-
van, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603, dismissed, 199 U. S. 612, (1905) ; Mogul Steam-
ship Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co. (1889) L. R. 23 Q. B. D. 598, aff'd (1892)
A. C. 25; PRoss-., TORTS 996 (1941).
' Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations, 41 HARv. L. REv. 728, 745
(1928) ; Sayre, Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. Rr. 663, 686 (1923).
' PRossER, TORTS 996 (1941).
10 237 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 2d 410 (1953).
"1 Westinghouse Electric Co. v. Diamond State Fibre Co., 268 Fed. 121 (D. C.
D. Del. 1920); Sperry and Hutchinson Co. v. Pommer, 199 Fed. 309 (N. D. N. Y.
1912) ; Cumberland Glass Manufacturing Co. v. DeWitt, 120 Md. 381, 87 At. 927
(1913), aff'd, 237 U. S. 447 (1915) ; Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E.
817 (1907). But cf. Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okla. 223, 229, 122 Pac. 203, 210
(1912) where it was held that use of fair means with the primary object of bettering
one's business which incidentally results in breach of plaintiff's contract is not
actionable.
12 Brief for Appellants, p. 10, Bryant v. Barber, 237 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 2d 410
(1953).
N. C. GxiT. STAT. § 75-5 (1950), and N. C. GEN. STAT. § 75-13 (1950).
14 Coleman v. Whisnant et al., 225 N. C. 494, 35 S. E. 2d 647 (1945). Relevant
to the question before the court here was the fact that the defendants had also
interfered with plaintiff's efforts to form other contracts. The court inferentially
did not consider the defendants' assignment of plaintiff's patent rights of sufficient
moment to justify the interference with plaintiff's contractual relations.1- 218 N. C. 740, 12 S. E. 2d 671 (1941).
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in the same city, contrary to his non-competitive agreement with the
plaintiff, it was held that the defendant was liable.
Where a party has a contract of his own which conflicts with the
contract of another, he is not precluded from acting to protect his own
contract. 16 One is also privileged to interfere with the contractual rela-
tions of another if he acts to protect the public health, safety, or morals,17
or to perform a duty owed a third person.' 8 There is a privilege to give
disinterested advice even though it incidentally results in a breach of
contract by one acting upon the advice, 19 and there is a privilege to
protect the ownership or condition of property.20 Furthermore, a prin-
cipal is privileged to act in protection of his agent's interests.2' And, of
course, one is privileged if he is acting in obedience to a governmental
order or regulation.
22
It has been said that the privilege to protect an interest equal to or
greater than the plaintiff's contract rights is conditional and is lost if
exercised for the wrong purpose.23 North Carolina, however, for many
years allowed intentional interference with contracts to convey interests
in land,24 elevating in a series of decisions what could have more easily
been considered privileged protection of interests, under the circum-
stances, to the status of an absolute right which could be asserted regard-
less of motive.25 Thus, in Holder v. Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank,
20
where plaintiff had contracted to sell a tract of land, and where defend-
ant, holder of a deed of trust on the land, induced the prospective buyer
to breach his contract, representing to him that the plaintiff could not
pass good title and that the defendant would sell the land after the pend-
ing foreclosure proceedings to the buyer for less than the contracted
1" Quinlivan v. Brown Oil Co., 96 Mont. 147, 29 P. 2d 374 (1934) ; Williams v.
Adams, 250 App. Div. 603, 295 N. Y. S. 86 (1937) ; Tidal Western Oil Corp. v.
Shackleford, 297 S. W. 279 (Tex. Civ. App., 1927). Cf. Elvington v. Waccamaw
Shingle Co., 191 N. C. 515, 132 S. E. 274 (1926) (tender to re-establish contract
relationship under expired option) ; Biggers v. Mathews, 147 N. C. 299, 61 S. E.
55 (1908) (solicit an assignment of contract rights in order to injure plaintiff).
1 Brimelow v. Casson, (1924) 1 Ch. 302.
"S Caverno v. Fellows, 300 Mass. 331, 15 N. E. 2d 483 (1938).
1" Arnold v. Moffitt, 30 R. I. 310, 75 Atl. 502 (1910).
20 O'Brien v. Western Union, 62 Wash. 598, 114 Pac. 441 (1911).
21 Gregory v. Dealer's Equipment Co., 156 Tenn. 273, 300 S. W. 563 (1927).
2 Garcia Sugars Corp. v. N. Y. Coffee and Sugar Exchange, 7 N. Y. S. 2d
532 (1938).
" Carpenter, Interference with Contractual Relations, 41 HARV. L. REv. 728,
746 (1928).
24 Swain v. Johnson et al., 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 619 (1909).
"Holder v. Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank, 208 N. C. 38, 178 S. E. 861
(1935) ; Elvington v. Waccamaw Shingle Co., 191 N. C. 515, 132 S. E. 274 (1926) ;
Biggers v. Mathews, 147 N. C. 299, 61 S. E. 55 (1908). Barnhill, J., in a con-
curring opinion in Bruton v. Smith, 225 N. C. 584, 36 S. E. 2d 9 (1945) inferred
that these decisions were exceptions bottomed upon the force and effect of the North
Carolina registration statute, i.e., that a party to an unregistered contract to convey
land has no contract rights for the courts to protect anyway.
26 208 N. C. 38, 178 S. E. 861 (1935) ; see Note, 14 N. C. L. Rxv. 112 (1935).
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amount, it was held that the defendant had a legal right to compete with
the plaintiff for the buyer and could exercise the right regardless of
motive. Later decisions have given land sale contracts more protection
from outside interference, refusing to recognize, as privileged, action by
the defendant in protection of his less clearly defined "rights"21 when
the contract is registered as required by statute.28  In Winston v. Lunt-
ber Co., 29 allegations by plaintiff that he had executed a contract with S,
owner of a certain tract, and registered the contract, by the terms of
which S agreed to sell certain timber on the tract, and that defendant
had unlawfully, wrongfully, and maliciously30 persuaded S to break his
contract with plaintiff and convey to the defendant instead were held
sufficient as against a demurrer.
3
1
That a party is liable for inducing breach of contract when he entices
away employees3 2 who have employment contracts with their employers
is also well established.33  This is made a misdemeanor by statute,
34
which may account for the fact that the criminal indictment is apparently
more common in this situation than a civil action.3 5
Although the general principle of liability for inducing3 6 breach of
contract has been discredited37 and limited38 in North Carolina -decisions,
it is submitted that the recent decision of Bryant v. Barber,39 has affir-
2 As in Holder v. Atlantic Joint Stock Land Bank, 208 N. C. 38, 178 S. E.
861 (1935) (right to compete for buyer of tract of land) ; Elvington v. Waccamaw
Shingle Co., 191 N. C. 515, 132 S. E. 274 (1926) (right to make tender under ex-
pired option) ; Biggers v. Mathews, 147 N. C. 299, 61 S. E. 55 (1908) (right to take
assignment of the contract).
2 8 N. C. GEN. STAT. §§ 47-18 (1950) ; Eller v. Arnold, 230 N. C. 418, 53 S. E. 2d
266 (1949) ; Bruton v. Smith, 225 N. C. 584, 36 S. E. 2d 9 (1945).20227 N. C. 339, 42 S. E. 2d 218 (1947).
20 "Malice" being the cornerstone of the basis of liability, meaning nothing more
than lack of legal justification or excuse. Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 135 N. C.
392, 47 S. E. 481 (1904) ; Morgan v. Smith, 77 N. C. 37 (1877) ; Jones v. Stanly,
76 N. C. 355 (1877) ; PROssER, TORTS 996 (1941).
2 It should be mentioned that knowledge of the existence of the contract by the
defendant is, of course, requisite to liability, Sineath et al. v. Katzis, 218 N. C. 740,
12 S. E. 2d 671 (1941), and that it must be shown that the defendant's wrongful
acts proximately caused the breach. Glencoe Sand and Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros.
Commission Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93 (1897).
22 As regards liability for procuring an employee's discharge to his damage, see
Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 135 N. C. 392, 47 S. E. 481 (1904). The question of
liability of a labor union for procuring breach of employment and related contracts
is extensive and complicated, and is not within the scope of this note.
" Sears v. Whitaker, 136 N. C. 37, 48 S. E. 517 (1904) ; Morgan v. Smith, 77
N. C. 37 (1877) ; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601 (1874).
' N. C. Gm. STAT. § 14-347 (1953).
2 For decisions construing this statute see Annotations, N. C. GaN. STAT. § 14-
347 (1953).
20 It has been said that mere negligence or non-feasance which results in a
breach of another's contract is not a basis for liability. Robins Dry Dock and
Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S. 303 (1927); Ford v. C. E. Wilson Co., 129 F. 2d
614 (2d Cir. 1942); Lamport v. 4175 Broadway, 6 F. Supp. 923 (S. D. N. Y.
1934).
2 Swain v. Johnson et al., 151 N. C. 93, 65 S. E. 619 (1909).2 Bruton v. Smith, 225 N. C. 584, 36 S. E. 2d 9 (1945).
2 237 N. C. 480, 75 S. E. 2d 410 (1953).
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matively extended this doctrine to the area of everyday business compe-
tition where a contracting party's competitor has attempted to appro-
priate the plaintiff's contract rights for himself.
40
R. G. HALL, JR.
Criminal Law-Search Warrants-Extension of the Law in
North Carolina
In North Carolina, search warrants are authorized by statute to issue
for the seizure of the following objects: (1) stolen property; (2) false
or counterfeit coins, notes, bills, or bonds, and instruments used for
counterfeiting them; (3) any personal property, tickets, books, papers,
and documents used in connection with and in the operation of lotteries,
gaming, and gambling;1 (4) liquor illegally possessed for the purpose
of sale ;2 (5) deserting seamen ;3 (6) game taken in violation of the game
laws ;4 and (7) re-used bottles.5 A search warrant may not issue for
any object not covered by statute,6 and its availability may not be ex-
tended by construction to any case not clearly covered by statute.7
At common law, facts discovered by illegal searches and seizures
could be used in evidence.8 In 1913, State v. Wallace9 recognized that
" A party is liable for any intentional, unprivileged interference with con-
tractual relations of others. Jasperson v. Dominion Tobacco Co., (1923) A. C.
709, L. R 92 P. C. 190. See also Philadelphia Record Co. v. Leopold, 40 F. Supp.
346, 348 (S. D. N. Y. 1941) (principle applicable to inducement to "tender spurious
performance," where professional puzzle solvers sold contestants answers to plain-
tiff's puzzle series, where the contestants were under no contractual obligation to
perform).
For a detailed study of the whole subject of liability for procuring breach of
contract see Annotation, 84 A. L. R 43 ; Annotation, 26 A. L. R. 2d 1227; Carpen-
ter, Interfereice with Contractual Relations, 41 HARv. L. REv. 728 (1928) ; Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARv. L. REv. 663 (1923).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 18-13 (1953).
'N. C. GEN. STAT. §14-351 (1953). 'N. C. GEN. STAT. § 113-91(d) (1952).
N. C. GEN. STAT. § 80-28 (1950).
' "Ordinarily even the strong arm of the law may not reach across the threshold
of one's dwelling and invade the sacred precinct of his home except under authority
of a search warrant issued in accord with pertinent statutory provisions." I re
Walters, 229 N. C. 111, 113, 47 S. E. 2d 709, 710 (1948) ; People ex rel. Simpson
Co. v. Kempner, 208 N. Y. 16, 101 N. E. 794 (1913) ; State v. Mann, 27 N. C. 45
(1844) ; MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEizuaz § 2(1950) ; cf. Ltr. of Atty.
Gen. of N. C. to Mr. J. K. Morris, 22 July 1952 ("It is seriously doubted if a
search warrant would be the proper method of searching a tourist camp which is
suspected of operating for immoral purposes.").
" Rose v. St. Clair, 28 F. 2d 189 (D. C. 1928) ; State v. Certain Contraceptive
Materials, 126 Conn. 428, 11 A. 2d 863 (1940) ; State ex rel. Wilson v. Quigg, 154
Fla. 348, 17 So. 2d 697 (1944) ; Powell v. State, 65 Okla. Cr. 221, 84 P. 2d 442
(1938) ; 47 Am. JuR. Searches and Seizures § 14 (1938).
' State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938).
9 162 N. C. 623, 631, 78 S. E. 1, 4 (1913). The court approved the following
statement of the rule: "It may be mentioned in this place that though papers and
other subjects of evidence may have been illegally taken from the possession of
the party against whom they are offered, or otherwise unlawfully obtained, this is
no valid objection to their admissibility if they are pertinent to the issue. The
court will not take notice how they were obtained, whether lawfully or unlawfully,
nor will it form an issue to determine that question."
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rule as existing in North Carolina. Under that doctrine, evidence seized
by officers either under an invalid search warrant or without any search
warrant could be admitted in evidence at trial, and the -defendant would
then be left to his right of civil action against the trespassing officer.10
Furthermore, under this doctrine it followed that evidence for which the
statute did not authorize a warrant to issue (e.g., burglar tools or mur-
der weapons) could be used in evidence when seized by means of an
illegal search. An act of the General Assembly of 193711 altered this
rule by providing that no facts discovered by means of an "illegal" search
warrant could be used as evidence in the trial of any action. The statu-
tory context of the word "illegal" indicates that it connotes a procedural
defect in the warrant, such as the failure of the investigating officer to
sign an affidavit under oath, or the failure of the magistrate to examine
him in regard thereto before issuing the warrant.1 2  Thus if a search
warrant were issued upon affidavit under oath and examination to
authorize a search for narcotics, although there is no statutory authority
for the issuance of such a warrant, quere as to whether any evidence
discovered under such a warrant would not be admissible under the com-
mon law in spite of the 1937 amendment. In 1938, the Supreme Court
in State v. McGee'3 pointed out the ineffectiveness of the 1937 amend-
ment in changing the common law rule admitting evidence obtained by
illegal search and seizure. This decision held that since the 1937 amend-
ment made no mention of articles seized in an unlawful search conducted
without any warrant at all, evidence so obtained was still admissible.
Then in 1951, the search warrant law was further amended by adding
the following proviso:
Provided, no facts discovered or evidence obtained without a legal
search warrant in the course of any search, made under conditions
requiring the issuance of a search warrant, shall be competent as
evidence in the trial of any action.14
As for objects set out in the statutes for which search warrants are
authorized to issue, it is clear that they may not be presented in evidence
where they are discovered under an "illegal" search warrant or without
" Riley v. Stone, 174 N. C. 588, 94 S. E. 434 (1917) ; Cohoon v. Speed, 47 N. C.
133 (1885).
N. C. Pub. Laws 1937, c. 339, § 12 (now N. C. GEar. STAT. § 15-27 [1953]).
12 "Any officer who shall sign and issue or cause to be signed and issued a search
warrant without first requiring the complainant or other person to sign an affidavit
under oath and examining said person or complainant in regard thereto shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor; and no facts discovered by reason of such illegal warrant
shall be competent as evidence in the trial of any action. ... ." N. C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15-27 (1953); see State v. Rhodes, 233 N. C. 453, 455, 64 S. E. 2d 287, 289
(1951).
1214 N. C. 184, 198 S. E. 616 (1938) (held, that the amendment constituted a
modification and not an abrogation of the common law rule).
1" N. C. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 644, § 1 (now N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-27 [1953]).
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any search warrant "where one is required." Quere as to the admissi-
bility of evidence obtained by a search made with or without a search
warrant in a case where no search warrant is authorized by statute; e.g.,
a search for instruments used in the commission of a felony, or for nar-
cotics.' 5 The wording of the provision might be construed to mean
that the statute contemplates only those situations where a warrant m1ay
issue, and not those situations where there is no provision for the issu-
ance of a search warrant.16
Under the North Carolina law therefore, search warrants may not
issue for property used in the commission of general felonies not covered
by the existing statutes, or for illegal narcotics. Thus if an officer were
to take it upon himself to search a suspect's home without a search war-
rant, for instruments used in the commission of a murder and found the
murder weapon, it is possible that the court would follow either of two
courses of action in ruling on the admissibility of the evidence. The
court might consider that the evidence was the result of an illegal search
where a search warrant is required and was therefore inadmissible; or,
on the other hand, the court might apply the common law doctrine to
such a case and admit the evidence, leaving the defendant to his civil
remedy. Since the passage of the 1951 amendment, the court has not
been called upon to decide whether the common law doctrine admitting
evidence obtained by illegal searches and seizures has been completely
abrogated in North Carolina. In either of the above two instances, it
would seem that the effective detection and prevention of crime is ham-
pered in this State by the fact that our search warrant law does not make
provision for issuance of search warrants to search for property used
in the commission of a felony or for narcotics.
A survey of the search warrant laws of the several states reveals that
fifteen states17 provide for the issuance of search warrants to search for
" Also, quere as to the admissibility of evidence obtained by an lotreasonable
search under a legal search warrant.8 "The courts determine the competency of evidence irrespective of the method
by which it was procured. An objection to an offer of proof made on the trial of
a cause raises no other question than that of its competency, relevancy and mate-
riality. On such objection the court cannot enter on the trial of a collateral issue
as to the source from which the evidence was obtained, unless expressly required
so to do by statute." State v. McGee, 214 N. C. 184, 186, 198 S. E. 616, 617 (1938).
" AIA. CODE tit. 15, § 101 (1940); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 44-3501 (1939); CAL.
PEN. CODE § 1524 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4402 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN.
c. 36, § 751.3 (1950) ; LA. Rxv. STAT. § 15:43 (1950); MD. ANN. CoDE GEN. LAws
art. 27, § 328 (1951) ; MONT. Rav. CODES ANN. § 301-2 (1947) ; NEY. Ray. STAT.
§ 29-801 (1943) ; N. Y. CRIMINAL CODE AND PENAL LAW § 792 (1945) ; N. D. REV.
CODE § 29-2902 (1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1222 (1947); ORE COMP.
LAws ANN. § 26-1702 (1940) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 11898 (Williams 1934); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-54-2 (1953) (A search warrant may be issued for property "(2)
When it was used as the means of committing a felony; in which case it may be
taken on the warrant from any place in which it is concealed, from any person in
whose possession it may be.").
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property used in the commission of a felony. Five states", authorize
the issuance of a warrant to search for property used in the commission
of a misdemeanor or a felony. Federal Rules' 9 authorize the issuance
of a search warrant for property "designed or intended for use or which
is or has been used as the means of committing a criminal offense." Ten
of the fifteen states allowing the issuance of a search warrant for property
used in the commission of a felony have an additional provision provid-
ing that search warrants may issue for property:
when it is in the possession of any person with the intent to use it
as the means of committing a public offense, or in the possession
of another to whom he may have delivered it for the purpose of
concealing it or preventing its being discovered, in which case it
may be taken on the warrant from such person, or from any place
occupied by him or under his control, or from the possession of
the person to whom he may have delivered it.
20
The Uniform Narcotics Act of North Carolina 2' makes adequate
provision for the punishment of violations of the Act and for seizure of
the contraband and vehicles used in its transportation. It seems that
an important means of enforcement is being withheld from the law en-
forcement officers of the state, however, in that there is no provision made
for the issuance of a search warrant to search places where it is suspected
that illegal traffic in narcotics is being carried on. A search of the perti-
nent statutes of the states reveals that thirteen states22 have specific
" FLA. STAT. ANN. § 993.02 (2) (a) (1941); OHIO GEN. CODE ANN. § 13430-1
(Supp. 1952) ; VT. REV. STAT. § 2447 (1947) ; Wis. STAT. § 363.02 (1951) ; Wyo.
Comp. STAT. AN. § 10-201 (1945).
1 Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b)(2) (1951).
20 Amiz. CODE ANN. § 44-3501(3) (1939); CAL. PEN. CODE § 1524(3) (1949);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-4402(3) (1947); IOWA CODE ANN. c. 36, § 7513(3)
(1950) ; MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 301-2(3) (1947) ; N. Y. CRIMINAL CODE AND
PENAL LAW §792(3) (1945); N. D. REv. CODE §2902(3) (1943); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 22, § 1222(3) (1947); ORE. Comp. LAWS ANN. §26-1702(3) (1940); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-54-2(3) (1953).
2N N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-86 et seq. (1950).
22FLA. STAT. ANN. § 933.02(3) (1941) ; LA. REv. STAT. § 15:43 (1950) ; MASS.
ANN. LAWS c. 94. § 214 (1946) ; MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 1053 (1937) ; MINN. STAT.
§ 618.12 (1945) ; Miss. CODE ANN. § 6837 (1952) ; N. H. REV. LAWS c. 424, § 1
(1942); N. M. STAT. ANN. §721 (VIII) (1941); TEx. CODE ClIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 725b(16) (1925) ; UTAH CODE Am. § 58-13-29 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§1385(19) (1949); Wis. STAT. §363.02(7) (1951); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN.
§ 46-214 (1945) ("It shall be lawful for any Justice of the Peace to issue search
warrants to search any building, house, premises, place, automobile, conveyance, or
person, for any of the drugs mentioned in this act [§§ 46-201 to 46-224]. Provided,
however, that no warrant for such search shall be issued except upon probable
cause and when there shall have been filed with the Justice a complaint in writing
under oath, particularly describing the building, house, premises, place, automobile,
conveyance, thing or person to be searched, the person to be seized, and alleging
substantially the offense in relation thereto, and that the complainant verily be-
lives that drugs mentioned in this Act are kept in violation of law, or so concealed
on such person, or in or about the place or thing to be searched.. .."' Ibid.
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statutes authorizing search warrants relative to the enforcement of their
narcotics law. It is also possible, of course, that search warrants may
be issued in other states to search for narcotics, if the state has a statute
authorizing the issuance of warrants to search for property "used in the
commission of a felony."
In order to help remove the doubt concerning the admissibility of
evidence obtained without a search warrant in cases where no warrant
may issue, and further, to aid the law enforcement officers of our State
more effectively to enforce our laws in a legal manner, it is submitted
that the search warrant statute, G. S. § 15-25,23 should be amended to
allow the issuance of search warrants for property used in the commis-
sion of a felony ;24 and that the Uniform Narcotics Act, G. S. § 90_110,25
should be amended to allow the issuance of search warrants to search




Federal Tort Claims Act-Discretionary Functions Exception
On June 8, 1953, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Dalehite
v. United States,' affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the
5th Circuit in the Texas City disaster cases.2 The District Court for
the Southern District of Texas had found for the plaintiffs, and that
judgment had been reversed and rendered for the United States by the
court of appeals. Leave to file a petition for rehearing was denied on
November 9, 1953.3
22N. C. GEN. STAT. § 15-25 (1953).
-' The Federal cases distinguish between evidence of the offense being carried
on and the instruments or fruits of the crime. Thus searches of one's house, office,
papers, or effects merely to get evidence to convict him of crime is considered a
violation of the self-incrimination prohibition; but searches for and seizure of
stolen property, counterfeit coins, burglar's tools, illicit liquor and gambling ap-
paratus is considered proper under the Federal law. U. S. v. Lefkowitz, 285 U. S.
452 (1932).
-5 N. C. GEN. STAT. § 90-110 (1950).
20 "The use of the search warrant to prevent and detect crime is a valid exercise
of the police power of the state. The constitutional provisions have no application
to reasonable rules and regulations adopted in the exercise of the police power for
the protection of the public health, morals, and welfare." 47 Am. JuR. Searches and
Seizures § 13 (1938).
-73 S. Ct. 956 (1953). Mr. Justice Reed delivered the prevailing opinion. Mr.
Justice Clark and Mr. Justice Roberts took no part in the case. Mr. Justice Jack-
son submitted a dissenting opinion in which Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice
Frankfurter concurred.
2 In re Texas City Disaster Litigation, 197 F. 2nd 771 (5th Cir. 1952). Three
of the six judges, while agreeing with the decision to reverse the judgment of the
district court, dissented from the decision to render judgment for the United States,
being of opinion that the facts alleged in the complaint set up grounds for relief
and that the cause should have been remanded for a new trial.




A brief summary of the facts underlying this litigation may be use-
ful.4 Shortly after the close of the second World War, the government
of the United States undertook or authorized the manufacture of a
product known as fertilizer grade ammonium nitrate, commonly referred
to as FGAN. Since ammonium nitrate was an important component
of explosives used by the armed forces, it had been manufactured during
the war at a number of government-operated ordnance plants. It was
therefore arranged that FGAN should be made in some fifteen otherwise
deactivated ordnance factories. The project was to be carried out largely
by private concerns, but they were to use government-approved formulae
and to be under the direct control of the government as to plans and
schedules of production, packaging, storage and shipping. Army per-
sonnel were assigned to supervise and direct the entire operation in all
its details.
The FGAN thus made was mainly designed for shipment abroad for
use in aiding in the agricultural rehabilitation of the occupied countries.
As part of this program a considerable quantity of FGAN had been
stored in Texas City where it was available for loading on ships sailing
from that port. In April, 1947, two ships, the Grandcamp and the High
Flyer, berthed in the harbor of Texas City, were being loaded with
FGAN. On the morning of April 16 fire was discovered in the hold of
the Grandcamp, and shortly thereafter the cargo of FGAN exploded
with such terrific violence that hundreds of the residents of Texhs City
were killed, and millions of dollars of property damage caused. The fire
spread to the High Flyer and subsequently that ship exploded also, with
further loss of life and property damage.
As a result of this disaster, almost 8,500 plaintiffs were assembled with
aggregate claims against the United States approximating $200,000,000.
The alleged rights of all claimants were grounded on the Federal Tort
Claims Act,5 and it was agreed that the validity of the rights of all should
be tested in the case of Dalehite v. United States, here under discussion.
If there was judgment for the plaintiff in that case, the only question in
the other cases would be the amount of 'damages to be assessed in each
instance; if judgment was rendered for the United States, all the other
complaints would be dismissed.
In arriving at its determination that the judgment of the court of
appeals in favor of the United States had been correct, the Supreme
'The proceedings in the district court and the court of appeals are ably reviewed,
with pertinent comment, in 101 U. oF PA. L. REv. 420-425 (December, 1952). It
is, therefore, unnecessary to restate at length the contentions of the parties or the
opinions of the judges in the lower courts.
28 U. S. C. §§ 1346, 2671-2678, 2680 (1950). The legal background, legislative
history and judicial interpretation (to 1948) of the Act are discussed in a compre-
hensive review in 26 N. C. L. REv. 119-138 (1949). See also 56 YALE L. J. 534
(1947).
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Court considered two questions: first, were the situations antecedent to
and leading up to the 'disaster covered affirmatively by the provisions of
the Act; and second, did one or more of the exceptions set forth in the
Act exempt the United States from liability under the circumstances.
The Court disposed of the contentions of the plaintiff on the first
question by reference to the provision of the Act conferring upon the
district courts "exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against
the United States ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury
or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any
employee of the government while acting within the scope of his office
or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private
person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred."6  (Emphasis provided.) It
was pointed out that the plaintiff did not allege negligent or wrongful
acts on the part of specified or named employees, which the wording of
the Act, in the view of the Court, required. 7 Plaintiff's theory that the
government should be held strictly liable, in view of the allegation that
it was, in effect, engaged in an inherently hazardous enterprise, was re-
jected on the ground that the Act requires proof of misfeasance or non-
feasance, thus excluding liability without fault.
However, the critical 'determination of the Court dealt with the pro-
visions of the Act defining situations in which the Act shall not apply.
In this case the most important such exception is the one relating to
discretionary acts worded to exclude any claim "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a Federal agency or an employee of the
Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused." s  No
serious question arose as to the power of the appropriate responsible
administrative officers to make the initial decision to manufacture FGAN,
nor was it contended that that decision, as such, involved the United
States in liability, either under the terms of the Tort Claims Act or under
the general principles of administrative law.9 The important questions
-28 U. S. C. § 1346 (1950).
'The Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, in Jackson v. United States, 196
F. 2d 725 (1952), held that the Act applied even where negligence was not proved
as to a specific employee, since the government can act only through the agency of
some employee. Therefore, if the government is negligent, it must be by reason of
the negligence of some person. Also, in State of Maryland for the use of Pumphrey
v. Manor Real Estate and Trust Co., et al., 176 F. 2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949), the
government was held liable without the finding of negligence on the part of a spe-
cific employee. (This case is discussed further, infra, p. 124.) There are other
cases that seem to apply the rule of general negligence, i.e., United States v. Hull,
195 F. 2d 64 (1st Cir. 1952), Phillips v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 943 (E. D.
Tenn. 1952), Blaine v. United States, 102 F. Supp. 161 (E. D. Tenn. 1951), and
Henson v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 148 (E. D. Mo. 1949).
828 U. S. C. § 2680(a) (1950).
For a discussion of the legal meanings and implications of discretionary as
distinguished from non-discretionary or ministerial acts, see Freund, Admninistra-
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related to the exempt character of the decisions and actions of employees
in the lower echelons of.authority. On this point the Court said: "Where
there is room for policy judgment there is discretion. If it were not so,
the protection of § 2680(a) would fail at the time it would be needed,
that is, when a subordinate performs or fails to perform a causal step,
each action or nonaction being directed by the superior, exercising, per-
haps abusing, discretion."
Hence the Court found that all the acts complained of by the plain-
tiff-alleged failure to complete investigations initiated to determine pos-
sible dangerous characteristics of FGAN, alleged negligent packaging of
a combustible product in combustible containers at high temperatures,
alleged failure to label the packages so as to give notice of the unstable,
highly combustible and potentially explosive nature of the contents, and
the alleged failure to warn handlers of the dangers of careless stowage-
were all discretionary, at one level of responsibility or another, and,
hence, not actionable under the provisions of the Act.
It is possible at this point to entertain the conclusion that the Court
has significantly modified the general attitude of federal courts in inter-
preting the Tort Claims Act. By and large, the opinions of the courts
in applying the law have tended in the direction of liberality. It is true
that it has been authoritatively determined that members of the armed
services, while on active duty, may not sue the government under the
Act.'0 But it has been held that military personnel may recover if on
tive Powers over Persons and Property (1928) cc. V and VI. The general rule
that discretionary administrative acts are not subject to judicial review or inter-
ference is too well established and too clearly understood to require extensive
supporting citation. The rule has been applied in a number of cases arising under
the Tort Claims Act. The following classes of cases will serve as examples:
a. Injuries and damage resulting without negligence from the execution of plans
for public works or public improvements: Coates v. United States, 181 F. 2d 816
(8th Cir. 1950), Harris v. United States, 106 F. Supp. 298 (E. D. Okla. 1952),
Lauterbach v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 479 (W. D. Wash. 1951), Boyce v. United
States, 93 F. Supp. 866 (S. D. Iowa 1950), Olson v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 150
(D. N. D. 1950), and Pacific National Fire Ins. Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority,
89 F. Supp. 978 (W. D. Va. 1950).
b. Damage resulting from alleged wrongful official acts and decisions of members
of the Securities Exchange Commission: Schmidt v. United States, 198 F. 2d 32
(7th Cir. 1952).
c.- Damage resulting from fall of experimental tree maintained by the Department
of Agriculture for research purposes: Toledo v. United States, 95 F. Supp. 838
(D. Puerto Rico 1951).
1028 U. S. C. § 2680(j) (1950) specifically exempts "Any claim arising out of
the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or the Coast Guard, during
time of war." (Emphasis provided.) In Feres v. United States, 340 U. S. 135
(1950), the Supreme Court held that neither servicemen nor their personal repre-
sentatives could sue under the Tort Claims Act for injuries or death caused by
accidents occurring in non-combatant activities in time of peace. The reasoning
was that the Court would not presume either that Congress intended to modify the
traditional relationship between the government and the members of the armed
forces, or that Congress intended to provide service personnel with redress other
than that available through the normal pension and compensation provisions of
existing law. Here the Court affirmed what had become the prevailing rule in
the lower courts.
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furlough," or if on liberty, even though still on the military reservation. 12
In a number of cases civilians have been awarded damages for in-
juries resulting from negligent acts of military personnel, and in some
such cases the courts have insisted that the circumstances fit both de-
scriptive phrases in the section, namely, that the injuries arise out of
"combatant activities" and "during time of war."'18 Neither has it been
true that the rule has been restricted to the torts of members of the non-
commissioned ranks. The government has been found liable for the
negligence of commissioned officers, although under the definition of dis-
cretion in the Dalehite case the officers might have been found to be
acting in a discretionary capacity.' 4
The United States has not been held liable for injuries to the wife of
a soldier resulting from the refusal of the authorities of a military hos-
pital to admit such person to care, 15 but in another case it was decided
that after a person in similar circumstances had actually been admitted
responsible hospital employees would be held to a standard of reasonable
care.'1 Here again, the acts complained of could have been held to be
discretionary by a strict construction of the word.17
"1 Brooks v. United States, 337 U. S. 49 (1949).
1" Brown v. United States, 99 F. Supp. 685 (S. D. W. Va. 1951).
"3 See note 10, .supra. In Skeels v. United States, 72 F. Supp. 372 (W. D. La.
1947), it was held that target practice by army airplanes during the war was not
a combatant activity and that a civilian injured as a result of such practice could
sue. (This case is cited with comment in 26 N. C. L. Rev. 119 (1948) ; see note 6,
supra.)
And in Johnson v. United States, 170 F. 2d 767 (9th Cir. 1948), it was held
that damage resulting from the discharge of oil and other noxious substances from
naval vessels anchored in Discovery Bay in 1946 was damage arising from non-
combatant activities, and that it was therefore unnecessary to consider the question
as to whether or not a state of war still existed at that time.
"' United States v. Gaidys, 194 F. 2d 762 (10th Cir. 1952), United States v.
Kesinger, 190 F. 2d 529 (10th Cir. 1951), Parcell v. United States, 104 F. Supp.
110 (S. D. W. Va. 1951), Moran v. United Sates, 102 F. Supp. 275 (D. Conn.
1951), Brouse v. United States, 83 F. Supp. 373 (N. D. Ohio 1949), and Beasley
v. United States, 81 F. S upp. 518 (E. D. S. C. 1948).
1" Denny v. United States, 171 F. 2d 365 (5th Cir. 1948).
" Costley v. United States, 181 F. 2d 723 (5th Cir. 1950).
1, It must, of course, be recognized that at least in theory the rule of strict
construction is applied to any statute modifying the sovereign immunity of the
federal government from suit by private parties. As to suits on contracts, the rule
was restated in United States v. Sherwood, 312 U. S. 584 (1941). In recent years,
however, there have been occasional signs of judicial restiveness. Thus, in Port-
land Trust & Savings Bank v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 953 (D. Ore. 1938), the
court voices the precaution that the rule should not be used "to violate an obvious
purpose of Congress by a too rigid application of that canon of construction."
Again, in Wallace v. United States, 142 F. 2d 240 (2d Cir. 1944), Judge Frank
reveals a strong conviction that the rule that "The King can do no wrong" is
repugnant to the spirit of a democracy. He applies the rule with obvious reluc-
tance. Finally, in Herren v. Farm Security Administration, 153 F. 2d 76 (8th Cir.
1946), the court says that the rule of strict construction "is not entitled to be made
a judicial vise to squeeze the natural and obvious import out of such a statute or
to sap its language of its normal and sound legal meaning."
In construing the Tort Claims Act the rule was applied without qualification in
the following cases: Cropper v. United States, 81 F. Supp. 81 (N. D. Fla. 1948),
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Almost from the beginning, and with the approval of the Supreme
Court, the courts have been willing to hold that insurers and others with
similar interests might be subrogated to the rights of injured persons,
although there is nothing in the Act which specifically authorizes such
subrogation.' 8 In St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. v. United States'9 the
main issue was the right of plaintiff to be subrogated to the rights of its
employees. However, the facts are interesting in connection with the
question under discussion. A number of railway employees had been
injured while handling certain defective military bombs which had been
consigned to the railway by the government for shipment. The issue of
liability was not directly before the court of appeals, but in reversing the
decision of the district court on the question of subrogation and remand-
ing the cause for a new trial, the court clearly intimated that in its opin-
ion the plaintiff had a good cause of action.
Two cases dteserve special mention as indicating the favorable attitude
heretofore taken by the courts toward claimants under the Tort Claims
Act, both on the issue of negligence and on the definition of discretion.
The first is the case of Lemaire v. United States" in which the complaint
alleged that a well drilled by the government had, by reason of its depth
and proximity, drained a water supply upon which plaintiff depended,
and that as a result the value of her land had been adversely affected.
Donovan v. McKenna, 80 F. Supp. 690 (D. Mass. 1948), and Long v. United
States, 78 F. Supp. 35 (S. D. Cal. 1948). But in Bates v. United States, 76 F.
Supp. 57 (D. Neb. 1948), the court, after stating the rule, says nevertheless that
the Act "should receive that construction consistent, of course, with its terms,
which will accord with a fair appraisal of its purposes, and within constitutional
limitations, effectuate them." In the following instances the courts have been
outspoken in opposition to the rule of strict construction: Employers' Fire Ins. Co.
v. United States, 167 F. 2d 655 (9th Cir. 1948), and United States v. Rosati, 97
F. Supp. 747 (D. N. J. 1951). The Supreme Court has indicated a favorable
attitude toward a liberal view in United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U. S. 543
(1951). In that case, in discussing the purpose of the Tort Claims Act as indi-
cated by Congressional hearings and discussions, and the history of legislation
waiving the government's immunity from suit, the Court says: "Recognizing such
a clearly defined breadth of purpose for the bill as a whole, and the general trend
toward increasing the scope of the waiver by the United States of its sovereign
immunity from suit, it is inconsistent to whittle it down by refinements."
" This question was settled by the Supreme Court in United States v. Aetna
Casualty and Surety Co., 338 U. S. 366 (1949), when on certiorari to the appro-
priate courts of appeals four cases involving the rights of insurers to be subrogated
to the rights of plaintiffs under the Act were decided against the government and
in favor of the insurers. It is interesting to note the conclusion of the late Chief
Justice Vinson's opinion, in which he quotes with approval Judge Cardozo's state-
ment in Anderson v. Hayes Construction Co., 243 N. Y. 140, 147, 153 N. E. 28, 29-
30 (1926) : "The exemption of the sovereign from suit is hardship enough where
consent has been withheld. We are not to add to its rigor by refinement of con-
struction where consent has been announced."
The Supreme Court of North Carolina, in Lyon & Sons v. Board of Education,
238 N. C. 34, 76 S. E. 2d 553 (1953), concurred in the liberal rule of construction
followed by the federal courts, and held that the state tort claims act granted, by
implication, the right of subrogation.
1 187 F. 2d 925 (5th Cir. 1951).
. 76 F. Supp. 498 (D. Mass. 1948).
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There was no allegation of negligence on the part of any federal em-
ployee. The court held that a good cause of action had been made out.
The second is the case of State of Maryland for the itse of Puunphrey
v. Manor Real Estate & Trust Co., et al.21 One of the unnamed de-
fendants was the United States, and the complaint against the United
States was the one entertained and discussed by the court. The Federal
Housing Authority had rented a number of old semi-detached houses in
the city of Baltimore and had converted them into apartments for the
accommodation of war workers. Six families were sheltered in each
house, all of them using the basement in common, among other purposes
for the disposition of garbage and waste. The floors of the basements
were of old and rotting wood. As the result of the combination of plen-
tiful food and ideal facilities for nests and runways, the basements be-
came heavily infested with active, fearless and well-fed rats. The condi-
tion was noted by the health authorities of the city of Baltimore, who
called it to the attention of the Housing Authority. The Health Depart-
meit issued no order and the Housing Authority took no action. In
October, 1946, several months after the remodelling had been completed,
two cases of typhus fever 'developed in the housing project. The United
States Health Service, after an investigation, established to their satis-
faction that the cases of typhus had been caused by the bites of infected
fleas that had, in turn, been infected by the rats. The Health Service
issued orders that the dens and runways of the rats be sealed off and
that the vermin be denied further means of access to the buildings from
the outside. The Housing Authority delegated the duty of carrying out
this order to the private agency that had been hired to manage the houses.
There was evidence that the work had been negligently done, but there
was no evidence fixing negligence upon any particular federal employee
or employees. In January, 1947, after the order just referred to had been
issued, plaintiff's husband came down with typhus fever and 'died before
the end of the month. The government cited § 2680(a) of the Tort
Claims Act in defense, but the court rejected the contention of protective
discretion. It was held that after the admittedly discretionary decision
to take over the houses had been arrived at, the government was charged
with the 'duty of keeping the premises safe for the tenants, and that its
failure to do so made it liable under the Act.
22
In the light of these cases, it is suggested that the Supreme Court
has brought to an abrupt stop an observable tendency on the part of the
2" 176 F. 2d 414 (4th Cir. 1949).
2For similar conclusions as to the meaning of §2680(a), see the following
cases: Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F. 2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951),
United States v. South Carolina Highway Department, 171 F. 2d 893 (4th Cir.
1948), Dishman v. United States, 93 F. Supp. 567 (D. Md. 1950), and Hodges v.
United States, 98 F. Supp. 281 (S. D. Iowa 1948).
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lower courts to apply the Tort Claims Act in a broad and liberal spirit.
The rule laid down in Dalehite v. United States would certainly have
reversed a number of the cases cited supra. However, there is perhaps
no reason to assume that the rule in the Dalehite case will be carried to
its ultimate, and logical, conclusion, namely, that the negligence of any
federal employee, however humble, and including truck drivers, will be
held to be exempt as a matter of discretion if the employee is acting under
the orders or supervision of responsible superiors who have laid down a
plan for the performance of his duties, but who, in the process, has de-
cisions of his own to make.
Of course, in all such matters, practical considerations cannot be
entirely ignored. Two hundred million dollars is a large sum of money,
by any measure, and as a penalty for negligence it is unquestionably
immense. There is nothing to indicate that this aspect of the situation
influenced the Court, unless, translating freely, one might read such an
intimation into the closing words of Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting
opinion: "Surely a statute so long debated was meant to embrace more
than traffic accidents.23 If not, the ancient and discredited doctrine that
'The King can do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been
amended to read, 'The King can do only little wrongs.'
MILTON E. LoomIs
Privacy-Unauthorized Use of Photographs-Infringement of
Personal and Property Rights
In a recent New York case, Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps,'
plaintiff manufacturer had contracts with certain major-league ball-
players for the exclusive right to exploit the publicity value of their
photographs in advertising its products. Defendant subsequently used
the photographs of these same ballplayers in a competing merchandising
and advertising scheme. 2 In an action to secure damages and to enjoin
"' The reference here is to the stress laid in the prevailing opinion upon the pre-
liminary hearings and debates in Congress, where the proposed legislation was de-
scribed as relating to "common law" or "run-of-the-mine" torts, and where almost
the only illustration offered was that of the motor vehicle accident.
1202 F. 2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953). Plaintiff had for several years been successfully
merchandising and advertising its bubble gum by using pictures of big-league ball-
players, which it obtained by exclusive contracts. Defendant, a competitor, at-
tempted to use pictures of players under contract with plaintiff. Held, plaintiff has
a cause of action for this infringement.
I This use of a photograph is to be distinguished from "indorsement" or "testi-
montal" advertising. One who falsely claims an indorsement may subject himself
to sec. 43(a) of the Lanham Act where a wrongdoer in cases of false advertising
is "liable to a civil action ... by any person who believes that he is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation." 60 STAT. 441,
15 U. S. C. § 1125(a) (1946). See CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE
MARis, § 20.2(f) (2d ed. 1950) ; Callman, False Advertising as a Competitive Tort,
48 CoL. L. REv. 876, 885 (1948).
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the use of such photographs as an encroachment on plaintiff's "rights
of publicity" in these pictures, defendant argued, and the lower court so
held, that a person has no legal interest in the publication of his picture
other than his non-assignable right-of privacy, consequently, plaintiff's
contracts constituted mere releases from liability to the ballplayers for
his invasion of their privacy through use of their photographs. On
appeal the court held that under New York law ". . . in addition to and
independent of that right of privacy (which in New York derives from
statute),3 a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e.,
the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and
that such a grant may validly be made 'in gross,' i.e., without an accom-
panying transfer of a business or of anything else."
'4
Prior to this decision a person might prevent the unauthorized com-
mercial publication of his name or photograph by invoking his right of
privacy. Consequently, he might "cash in" on his publicity value by the
threat of a privacy suit. Privacy, however, was developed as the per-
sonal, 6 non-assignable" right of the individual to be let alone.8 While
damages for injured feelings are a just compensation for the person who
desires seclusion, an actress who has been in the limelight and whose
feelings cannot be said to be injured by publicity can recover only nomi-
nal damages for invasion of her privacy. Although -defendant violated
the New York Privacy Statute, the plaintiff could show no loss and
N . Y. CIVL RIGHTs LAW §§ 50, 51 (1938). "Any person whose name, por-
trait or picture is used within this state for advertising purposes or purposes of
trade without the written consent first obtained . . . may maintain an equitable
action . . . against the person . . . so using . . . to prevent and restrain the use
thereof; and may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained by rea-
sons of such use. . . ." This statute is the result of a rejection of the right of pri-
vacy at common law in Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N . Y. 538, 64
N. E. 442 (1902). North Carolina, on the other hand, recognized the common law
right of privacy in Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55
(1938) and relied on the able dissent of Judge Gray in the above New York case.
'Haelan Laboratories v. Topps, 202 F. 2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953). There
being some question of defendant wrongfully inducing a breach of contract, Chief
Judge Swan concurred "... in so much of the opinion as deals with the defendant's
liability for intentionally inducing a ballplayer to breach a contract which gave a
plaintiff the exclusive privilege of using his picture."
'Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 239 P. 2d 630 (1952) ; Kerby v. Hal
Roach Studies, 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P. 2d 577 (1942) ; Pavesich v. New Eng-
land Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S. E. 68 (1915) ; Pallas v. Crowley, Milner Co.,
322 Mich. 411, 33 N. W. 2d 911 (1948) ; Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N. C.
780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938) ; Warren and Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
'Von Thodorovich v. Franz Josef Beneficial Ass'n, 154 Fed. 911 (C. C. E. D.
Pa. 1907) ; Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P. 2d 491
(1939) ; Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N. Y. 434, 42 N. E. 22 (1896) ; Wyatt v. Hall's
Portrait Studio, 71 Misc. 199, 128 N. Y. Supp. 247 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1864 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1915).
' Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S. D. N. Y. 1939) ; Jones
v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S. W. 2d 972 (1929) ; Brents v. Morgan, 221
Ky. 765, 299 S. W. 967 (1927) ; Holloman v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 192 S. C. 454,
7 S. E. 2d 169 (1940).
(Vol. 32
NOTES AND COMMENTS
recovered nothing for the commercial exploitation of her name and
photograph.9 A professional entertainer may waive his right of privacy
against the unauthorized and protested telecasting of his act to thousands
of non-paying onlookers because at the time he was performing publicly.
10
Thus, it has been submitted that privacy may be an inadequate remedy
for those who desire publicity rather than to be let alone." A "right of
publicity," however, would assure damages commensurate with the com-
mercial value of a celebrity's name or photograph, and prior publicity
would enhance the value of the right rather than constitute a waiver of
a cause of action.
Defendant's contentions, in the principal case, that one has no legal
interest in the publication of his picture other than his right of privacy
is based on an earlier New York case' 2 where plaintiff was denied pro-
tection of his contractual rights to the exclusive use of the photographs
of certain motion picture actresses. However, specific reference was
made to the fact that the complaint was predicated on the New York
privacy statute, so the question of other rights, such as the "right of
publicity," was not before the court. Defendant's argument overlooks
the fact that a person may have a common law copyright in his photo-
graph, 13 and that contract rights have been enforced against a photog-
rapher for the unauthorized publication of a customer's picture.14 Doc-
trinally important in the Haelan case is the holding that the grant of the
exclusive privilege to use a person's photograph may validly be made "in
gross," i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or anything
else. This is in direct opposition to a Fifth Circuit ruling involving the
assignability of names of famous ballplayers, 15 which relied strongly on
'Harris v. H. S. Gossard Co., 194 App. Div. 688, 185 N. Y. Supp. 861 (1921).
Actress sued to recover damages for the unauthorized use of her name and portrait
for advertising and purposes of trade contrary to the New York Civil Rights Law.
Since her name and portrait had frequently -been published without objection on
her part and since in this case she admitted that she was not averse to the publicity
gained by such publications, and that it helped her in her profession, a verdict of
six cents was held not insufficient.
0 Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485 (1952).
" Note, The Right of Privacy, 7 N. C. L. REv. 435, 438 and n. 16 (1929).
" Pekas Co. v. Leslie, 52 N. Y. L. J. 1864 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1915).
"Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 304, 309, 95 P. 2d 491, 496
(1939).
"'Myers v. Afro-American Pub. Co., Inc., 168 Misc. 429, 5 N. Y. S. 2d 223
(Sup. Ct. 1938) ; Pollard v. Photographic Co., 1889 L. R. 40 Ch. D. 345 (1888).
" Hanna Mfg. Co. v. Hillerich & Bardsky Co., 78 F. 2d 763 (C. C. M. D. Ga.
1935). Plaintiff, a manufacturer of baseball bats, contracted with certain famous
ballplayers for the exclusive right to use their names in advertising its bats. The
bats were marked with a player's autograph, and each model became known to
purchasers by the name it bore. Defendant, a competitor, without agreements with
the players under contract with plaintiff, stamped the players' names in block let-
ters on its bats. One ground on which the District Court granted an injunction
was that defendant's practice violated plaintiff's property right to the use of the
names. The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on this ground since a player has
in his name no property right assignable in gross according to its holding. Re-
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the general rule that a trade-mark, trade name or the good will of a
business cannot be assigned apart from the business in which it is em-
ployed.16 This general rule, however, is not without exception 17 and
it has been suggested that a more sensible rule would recognize assigna-
bility where there is no likelihood of deception to the public.18
The "right of publicity" has, by implication, been recognized in the
exclusive right of an agent to sell the indorsement of a famous designer
who attempted to breach her contract ;19 in the good name, reputation,
and good will of a hockey team which derived substantial revenues from
the licensing of genuine photographs of the team by name in feature
motion pictures ;20 and in the exclusive right to use a person's name in
a manufacturing process. 21 Other cases recognize a property right in a
person's photograph on the theory that the pecuniary value therefrom
should belong to its owner rather than to one seeking to make an un-
authorized use of it.22 Where an unauthorized publication has resulted
in no injury to the personality of an individual and privacy is an inade-
quate remedy, some courts, by dicta, imply the possibility of recovery on
quasi-contract or some other legal theory.
23
ferring to the names of famous ballplayers the court said: "But if they be his
property in a sense, they are not vendible in gross so as to pass from purchaser to
purchaser unconnected with any trade or business. Fame is not merchandise. It
would help neither sportsmanship nor business to uphold the sale of a famous name
to the highest bidder as projperty."
" United Drug Co. v. Rectanus Co., 248 U. S. 90 (1918) ; Everett 0. Fisk Co.
v. Fisk Teachers Agency, Inc., 3 F. 2d 7 (C. C. D. Colo. 1924) ; Detroit Creamery
Co. v. Velvet Brand I. C. Co., 187 Mich. 312, 153 N. W. 664 (1915); Falk v.
American West Indies Trading Co., 180 N. Y. 445, 73 N. E. 239 (1905).
"Uproar Co. v. Nat. Broadcasting Co., 8 F. Supp. 358 (D. Mass. 1934), aff'd
as .odified, 81 F. 2d 373 (C. C. D. Mass. 1936). See note, 19 MINN. L. Rav. 477
(1935); Mahlsted v. Fugit, 79 Cal. App. 568, 180 P. 2d 777 (1947).
Note, 28 COL. L. Ray. 353, 356 (1928).
1 Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N.E. 214 (1917). Plain-
tiff, who possessed a business organization adapted to the placing of such designs
and indorsements as he might make or approve, entered into an agreement for the
exclusive right to use the name of defendant, a famous designer. Defendant at-
tempted to break the contract by authorizing to others the use of her indorsement
on dresses, etc. Held, plaintiff had contract rights to the exclusion of defendant's
practices.
"0 Madison Square Garden v. Universal Pictures, 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N. Y. S.
2d 845 (Sup. Ct. 1938). For many years plaintiff granted licenses to take and
reproduce photographs of events in its arena, Madison Square Garden, for use in
motion picture news reels only, but not for use in feature films without plaintiff's
consent. Defendant, produced a feature film of plaintiff's arena and team without
permission and payment. Held, plaintiff had a property right in its reputation and
good will which defendant had infringed.
2'Liebig's Extract of Meat Co. v. Liebig Extract Co., 180 Fed. 688 (C. C. S. D.
N. Y. 1910). Complainant, held, entitled to an injunction restraining defendant
from using the word "Liebig" in connection with the sale of the extract of meat,
on evidence showing without contradiction that Baron Liebig granted to complain-
ant's predecessor in business the exclusive right to use his name in connection with
extract of meat made by his process.
" Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 134 S. W. 1076 (1911); Edison v.
Edison Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 N. J. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (Ch. 1907).
"3 O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1941) cert.
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The question of whether the "right of publicity" is recognizable, as
such, has yet to be presented in North Carolina. In Flake v. Greensboro
News Co.,24 however, a recognition of the right of privacy provided
indirect protection to one's commercial interest in his name and photo-
graph. Certain language in the Flake case in labeling rights in a per-
son's photograph as a "property" right; in referring to the value in one's
features as exclusively his until granted away; and in recognizing that
modern advertising techniques consider the name or photograph of some
people a valuable asset, indicates that a decision, if and when rendered,
would be substantially in accord with the principal case. It is submitted
that an action in privacy is inadequate protection to commercial interests
in personality; and, in agreement with the Haelan case, the value of this
commercial interest will be greatly diminished if, as an incident to a
purchase, a legally protectible interest is not transferred as the "right of
publicity."*
JOHN RANDOLPH INGRAM
Torts-Charitable Institutions-Liability to Paying Patients
In two recent cases' the North Carolina Supreme Court held that a
charitable hospital was not liable in damages to a paying patient for
injuries caused by the negligence of employees of the hospital on the
grounds that (1) The doctrine that a charitable institution may not be
held liable to a beneficiary of a charity for the negligence of its servants
or employees if it has exercised due care in their selection and retention
is settled law in this jurisdiction and should not be lightly overruled or
whittled away by the court and (2) On the basis of authority and rea-
soning, no exception should be made in the rule of immunity in favor
of paying patrons of charitable institutions.
Justice Barnhill dissented saying that when a hospital charges and
receives pay for services rendered a patient, it assumes an obligation to
denied, 315 U. S. 823 (1942) ; Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162
P. 2d 133 (1945) ; Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N. Y. 354, 107 N. E. 2d 485
(1952). For illustration of the reasonableness of such recovery see Holmes, quot-
ing Readers Digest, Dec., 1941, p. 23 in O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F. 2d 167,
171 n. 6 (C. C. N. D. Tex. 1941) (dissenting opinion), "Illustrative of the value
of the use of one's picture for advertising purposes, Gene Tunney says: 'While I
was training for my second fight with Jack Dempsey I was offered $15,000 to
endorse a certain brand of cigarettes. I didn't want to be rude, so, in declining, I
merely said I didn't smoke. Next day the advertising man came back with another
offer: $12,000 if I would let my picture be used with the statement that "Stinkies
must be good, because all my friends smoke them."' (This offer also was refused.)."
24212 N. C. 780, 195 S. E. 55 (1938).
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in the principal case. 74 Sup. Ct. 26
(1953).
' Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 237 N. C. 395, 75 S. E. 2d 308 (1953)
(The case was first before the Supreme Court in 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951)).
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exercise due care and should be subjected to the same responsibility that
is imposed on others.
The decisions on this question have been in almost hopeless conflict.
The paying patient has recovered against the hospital for negligence of
physicians, 2 nurses,3 and employees, 4 and for administrative negligence,
such as negligence of the superintendent, 5 failure to provide safe equip-
ment,6 or failure to select competent nurses and employees. In other
cases he has been denied recovery against the hospital not only for negli-
gence of physicians, 8 nurses,9 and employees,10 but also for administra-
2 Moeller v. Hauser, 54 N. W. 2d 639 (Minn. 1952).
' Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; England v.
Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1940); Silva v.
Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1940) ; Durney v. St. Francis
Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951) ; Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v. Gol-
den, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952) ; Nicholson v. Good Samaritan Hospital, 145 Fla. 360,
199. So. 344 (1940) ; Parrish v. Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) ; Haynes v.
Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950) ; Borwege v.
City of Owatonna, 190 Minn. 394, 251 N. W. 915 (1933) ; Sisters of the Sorrowful
Mother v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938) ; City of Pawhuska v. Black,
117 Okla. 108, 244 Pac. 1114 (1926) ; City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okla. 60, 223
Pac. 354 (1924) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460,
78 P. 2d 645 (1938) ; Gitzhoffen v. Sisters of Holy Cross Hospital Ass'n, 32 Utah
46, 88 Pac. 691 (1907) ; Pierce v. Yakima Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P. 2d 765
(Wash. 1953).
'O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939) (limited to nontrust funds); Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist
Convention, 55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (limited to funds from paying
patients) ; Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (limited
to funds from paying patients) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss.
906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), aff'd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1952) ; Volk v. City of New
York, 284 N. Y. 279, 30 N. E. 2d 596 (1940) ; Sheehan v. North Country Com-
munity Hospital, 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. 2d 28 (1937) ; City of Okmulgee v. Carl-
ton, 180 Okla. 605, 71 P. 2d 722 (1937) ; Galvin v. Rhode Island Hospital, 12 R. I.
411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879) (rule changed by statute in 1896) ; Vanderbilt Uni-
versity v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938) (limited to
liability insurance).
'Dillon v. Rockaway Beach Hospital, 284 N. Y. 176, 30 N. E. 2d 373 (1940).
o St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952) (limited
to nontrust funds) ; Fields v. Mountainside Hospital, 22 N. J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2d
701 (Cir. Ct. 1944) ; Gordon v. Harbor Hospital, 275 App. Div. 1047, 92 N. Y. S.
2d 101 (1949); Texas Medical & Surgical Memorial Hospital v. Cauthorn, 229
S. W. 2d 932 (Tex. 1949) ; Miller v. Sisters of St. Francis, 5 Wash. 2d 204, 105
P. 2d 32 (1940).
7 Georgia Baptist Hospital v. Smith, 37 Ga. App. 92, 139 S. E. 101 (1927);
Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914) ; Taylor v. Flower Deaconess
Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922) ; St. Paul's Sanitarium
v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914) ; Norfolk Protestant Hospital
v. Plunkett, 162 Va. 151, 173 S. E. 363 (1934) ; Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619,
89 P. 2d 807 (1939) ; Tribble v. Missionary Sisters of the Sacred Heart, 137 Wash.
326, 242 Pac. 372 (1926).
8 Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Hearns v. Water-
bury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895) ; Schloendorff v. Society of N. Y.
Hospital, 211 N. Y. 125, 105 N. E. 92 (1914); Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470,
135 Pac. 235 (1913) ; Richardson v. Carbon Hill Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac.
95 (1895). Most cases hold that the hospital is not liable because the physician is
not a servant of the hospital but more in the nature of an independent contractor.
' Deming Ladies' Hospital Ass'n v. Price, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921) ; Pater-
lini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 639 (3rd Cir. 1918) ; Powers v. Mass.




Some courts have allowed12 or denied 13 recovery to a patient without
App. 2d 656, 62 P. 2d 1075 (1936) ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429,
47 P. 2d 740 (1935) ; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac.
1008 (1918); Hearns v. Waterbury Hospital, 66 Conn. 98, 33 Atl. 595 (1895);
Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82 P. 2d 849
(1938) ; Hogan v. Chicago-Lying-In Hospital, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929) ;
St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Cook v. John
N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918); Adams v.
University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Sibilia v. Paxton
Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N. W. 751 (1931); Duncan v. Neb. Sani-
tarium Benevolent Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; D'Amato v. Orange
Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 AtI. 340 (1925) ; Taylor v. Protestant
Hospital Ass'n, 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N. E. 1089 (1911) ; Gregory v. Salem General
Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227
Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E.
512 (1914); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45 S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931) ;
Weston's Adm'x v. Hospital of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 387, 107 S. E. 785
(1921); Weiss v. Swedish Hospital, 16 Wash. 2d 446, 133 P. 2d 978 (1943);
Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399, 169 Pac. 828 (1918) ; Roberts v.
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925) ; Morrison v.
Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 160 N. W. 173 (1916); Bishop Randall Hospital v. Hartley,
24 Wyo. 408, 160 Pac. 385 (1916). Nurses, except the patient's private nurse, are
usually considered hospital employees but a few courts consider them independent
contractors or employees of the physician or of the patient. Jordan v. Touro In-
firmary, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 726 (1922) (nurse in operating room) ; Wallstedt
v. Swedish Hospital, 220 Minn. 274, 19 N. W. 2d 426 (1945) (nurse in operating
room); Phillips v. Buffalo General Hospital, 239 N. Y. 188, 146 N. E. 199 (1924)
(orderly).
" Southern Methodist Hospital and Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46
P. 2d 118 (1935), overruled by Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230
P. 2d 220 (1951) ; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d
520 (1931); Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 344, 41 N. E. 2d
314 (1942); Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918),
overruled by Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241 Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d
151 (1950); Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital and Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan.
307, 10 P. 2d 859 (1932) ; Nickolson v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Hospital Ass'n, 97
Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 (1916); Howard v. South Baltimore General Hospital,
191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948) ; Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hospital, 261
Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933) ; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60
N. W. 42 (1894) ; Roberts v. Kirksville College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 16 S. W.
2d 625 (Mo. App. 1929); Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home & Hospital,
281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920); Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms, 135 App. Div.
178, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1909); Duncan v. St. Luke's Hospital, 113 App. Div.
68, 98 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1906), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 580, 85 N. E. 1109 (1908) ; Baylor
University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. 2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Meade v. St. Francis,
74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953) ; Fisher v. Ohio Valley General Hospital Ass'n, 73
S. E. 2d 667 (W. Va. 1952); Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d 212
(1942) ; Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconness Soc., 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476
(1935).
" Paterlini v. Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 247 Fed. 629 (3d Cir. 1918).
1 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951) (negligent
employee) ; Mulliner v. Evangelischer Diakonniessenverein, 144 Minn. 392, 175
N. W. 699 (1920) (negligent nurse) ; International Order of Twelve of Knights
and Daughters v. Barnes, 204 Miss. 333, 37 So. 2d 487 (1948) (negligent selec-
tion); Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337, 9 A. 2d 761 (1939)
(negligent employee) ; Holtfoth v. Rochester General Hospital, 304 N. Y. 27, 105
N. E. 2d 610 (1952) (faulty equipment); Santos v. Unity Hospital, 301 N. Y.
153, 93 N. E. 2d 574 (1950) (administrative negligence).
1 Negligent physicians: Erwin v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 323 Mich. 114,
34 N. W. 2d 480 (1948) ; Bruce v. Henry Ford Hospital, 254 Mich. 394, 236 N. W.
813 (1931) ; Van Tassell v. Manhattan Eye & Ear Hospital, 67 Sup. Ct. Rep., N. Y.
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any mention of whether he paid. Others have ruled that payment could
not change the nature of the institution 14 or the rule of liability.15  The
(60 Hun) 585, 15 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1891). Negligent nurses: Shane v. Hospital
of the Good Samaritan, 2 Cal. App. 2d 334, 37 P. 2d 1066 (1934) ; Cashman V.
Meriden Hospital, 117 Conn. 585, 169 At. 915 (1933) ; Davin v. Kansas Medical,
Missionary & Benevolent Ass'n, 103 Kan. 48, 172 Pac. 1002 (1918); Browder v.
City of Henderson, 182 Ky. 771, 207 S. W. 479 (1919) (immunity of both city
and charity) ; Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d 139 (1945) ; Thibo-
daux v. Sisters of Charity of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466
(1929) ; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary, 107 Me. 408, 78 Ati. 898 (1910) ;
Joel v. Woman's Hospital, 96 Sup. Ct. Rep., N. Y. (89 Hun) 73, 35 N. Y. Supp.
37 (1895) ; Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936) ;
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Steele v. St. Joseph's Hospital, 60 S. W. 2d 1083 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933). Negli-
gent employees: Ritchie v. Long Beach Community Hospital Ass'n, 139 Cal. App.
688, 34 P. 2d 771 (1934) (not liable because charity and also no evidence of proxi-
mate cause); Levy v. Superior Court of Cal., 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100
(1925); Brown v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929)
(not liable because only trust funds available) ; Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial
Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d 443 (1946) ; Maretick v. South
Chicago Community Hospital, 297 Ill. App. 488, 17 N. E. 2d 1012 (1938); Kidd
v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 237 Mass. 500, 130 N. E. 55 (1921) ; Robinson v.
Washtenow Circuit Judge, 228 Mich. 225, 199 N. W. 618 (1924) (immunity of
both state and charity) ; Woods v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 6 N. J. Super. 47, 69
A. 2d 742 (1949); Rudy v. Lakeside Hospital, 115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N. E. 126
(1927) ; Barnes v. Providence Sanitarium, 229 S. W. 588 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) ;
Bise v. St. Luke's Hospital, 181 Wash. 269, 43 P. 2d 4 (1935). Administrative
negligence: Boardman v. Burlingame, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938) (fraud) ;
Lenahen v. Ancilla Domini Sisters, 331 Ill. App. 27, 72 N. E. 2d 445 (1947) (neg-
ligent selection) ; Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E.
392 (1920) (negligent selection) ; Pepke v. Grace Hospital, 130 Mich. 493, 90
N. W. 278 (1902) (negligent selection) ; Fair v. Atlantic City Hospital, 25 N. J.
Misc. 65, 50 A. 2d 376 (Cir. Ct. 1946) (faulty equipment); Walsh v. Sisters of
Charity of St. Vincent's Hospital, 47 Ohio App. 228, 191 N. E. 791 (1933) (faulty
equipment).
" Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Arm-
strong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. 2d 429, 47 P. 2d 740 (1935) ; Boardman v. Burlin-
game, 123 Conn. 646, 197 Atl. 761 (1938) ; Jensen v. Maine Eye & Ear Infirmary,
107 Me. 408, 78 Atl. 898 (1910) ; Downs v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60
N. W. 42 (1894) ; Lindler v. Columbia Hospital, 98 S. C. 25, 81 S. E. 512 (1914);
Miller v. Mohr, 198 Wash. 619, 89 P. 2d 807 (1939).
" Hospital liable: Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220
(1951) ; Durney v. St. Francis Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951) ; Taylor
v. Flower Deaconess Home and Hospital, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N. E. 287 (1922) ;
St. Paul's Sanitarium v. Williamson, 164 S. W. 36 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914). Hos-
pital not liable: Deming Ladies' Hospital Ass'n, 276 Fed. 668 (8th Cir. 1921);
Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Southern
Methodist Hospital & Sanatorium v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. 2d 118 (1935),
overruled by Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, supra as to liability but not as to
effect of payment; Stonaker v. Big Sisters Hospital, 116 Cal. App. 375, 2 P. 2d
520 (1931) ; Burdell v. St. Luke's Hospital, 37 Cal. App. 310, 173 Pac. 1008 (1918) ;
St. Vincent's Hospital v. Stine, 195 Ind. 350, 144 N. E. 537 (1924) ; Browder v. City
of Henderson, 182 Ky. 771, 207 S. W. 479 (1919) ; Thibodaux v. Sisters of Charity
of the Incarnate Word, 11 La. App. 423, 123 So. 466 (1929); Howard v. South
Baltimore General Hospital, 191 Md. 617, 62 A. 2d 574 (1948); Nicholas v. Evan-
gelical Deaconness Home & Hospital, 281 Mo. 182, 219 S. W. 643 (1920) ; Adams
v. University Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); D'Amato v.
Orange Memorial Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 AtI. 340 (1925) ; Gable v. Sisters
of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910); Enell v. Baptist Hospital, 45
S. W. 2d 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931); Baylor University v. Boyd, 18 S. W. 2d 700
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929) ; Magnuson v. Swedish Hospital, 99 Wash. 399 169 Pac.
828 (1918) ; Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913) ; Roberts v.
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paying patient may not have recovered because he was a recipient of
charity,' his payment being merely a contribution to the charity rather
than payment for services, 17 or he may have recovered because he was
not a recipient of charity.' 8
Generally where the patient has sued for breach of contract, he has
not recovered on the ground that where there is no recovery in tort there
can be none in contract if the breach is essentially a tort.19 In other
states he has recovered on breach of contract.20  Because of negligent
service, a patient has been allowed to recover the money paid to the
hospital2 ' and, where sued by the hospital for the value of services ren-
dered, to set up the defense of negligent service.
22
In suits against company hospitals maintained by joint contributions
of employees and the employer, the employee-patient has been either
allowed recovery because the hospital is not a charity,23 or denied re-
covery because the hospital was a charity.
24
Ohio Valley General Hospital, 98 W. Va. 476, 127 S. E. 318 (1925); Schau v.
Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W. 2d 212 (1942).
1" Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Downs
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Duncan v. Neb. Sanitarium
Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial
Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 Atl. 340 (1925); Cunningham v. Sheltering Arms,
135 App. Div. 178, 119 N. Y. Supp. 1033 (1909) ; Sisters of The Sorrowful Mother
v. Zeidler, 183 Okla. 454, 82 P. 2d 996 (1938); Weston's Adm's v. Hospital of
St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 107 S. E. 785 (1921).
17 Powers v. Mass. Homeopathic Hospital, 109 Fed. 294 (1st Cir. 1901) ; Downs
v. Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894); Adams v. University
Hospital, 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907) ; D'Amato v. Orange Memorial
Hospital, 101 N. J. L. 61, 127 A. 340 (1925); Mills v. Society of the New York
Hospital, 242 App. Div. 245, 274 N. Y. Supp. 233 (1934), aff'd 270 N. Y. 594, 1
N. E. 2d 346 (1936).
" Silva v. Providence Hospital, 14 Cal. 2d 762, 97 P. 2d 798 (1940) ; Suwannee
County Hospital Corp. v. Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Mississippi Baptist
Hospital v. Holmes, 214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), aff'd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss.
1952).
" Wattman v. St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n, 314 Ill. App. 244, 41 N. E. 2d 314
(1942) ; Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa 1378, 168 N. W. 219 (1918) ; Cook
v. John N. Norton Memorial Infirmary, 180 Ky. 331, 202 S. W. 874 (1918) ; Roosen
v. Peter Bent Brigham Hospital, 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392 (1920) ; Greatrex v.
Evangelical Deaconness Hospital, 261 Mich. 327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933) ; Downs v.
Harper Hospital, 101 Mich. 555, 60 N. W. 42 (1894) ; Duncan v. Neb. Sanitarium
Benev. Ass'n, 92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912) ; Fields v. Mountainside Hos-
pital, 22 N. J. Misc. 72, 35 A. 2d 701 (Cir. Ct. 1944) ; Duncan v. St. Luke's Hos-
pital, 112 App. Div. 68, 98 N. Y. Supp. 867 (1906), aff'd, 192 N. Y. 580, 85 N. E.
1109 (1908) ; Gable v. Sisters of St. Francis, 227 Pa. 254, 75 Atl. 1087 (1910).
" Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915) ; Parrish v.
Clark, 107 Fla. 598, 145 So. 848 (1933) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hos-
pital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d 645 (1938).
'Armstrong v. Wesley Hospital, 170 Ill. App. 81 (1912).
"2 Beverly Hospital v. Early, 292 Mass. 201, 197 N. E. 641 (1935) (But he
could not set up this defense by way of recoupment since a charitable hospital is not
liable in Mass.).
" Bowman v. Southern Pac. Co., 55 Cal. App. 734, 204 Pac. 403 (1922) ; Phil-
lips v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry., 211 Mo. 419, 111 S. W. 109 (1908) ; Texas & Pacific
Coal v. Connaughton, 20 Tex. Civ. App. 642, 50 S. W. 173 (1899); Sawdey v.
Spokane Falls & N. Ry., 30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902).
"Union Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 60 Fed. 365 (8th Cir. 1894) ; Nickolson v. Atchi-
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Recovery by the paying patient has depended in part on whether he
knew at the time he entered the hospital that it was a charitable institu-
tion.2 5  It has depended on whether the hospital carried liability insur-
ance26 or whether it had other nontrust property.27  In most states the
existence of liability insurance has had no effect on either liability or
recovery.
28
Although the weight of older authority is definitely on the side of
nonliability of charitable hospitals to patients for the negligence of hos-
pital employees, the trend is toward liability. Of the 30 states that have
passed on this precise question since 1930, 13 denied recovery, 29 12 al-
lowed unconditional recovhry,3° three allowed recovery limited to liability
insurance or funds from paying patients,"' and two under statutory pro-
son, T. & S. F. Hospital Ass'n, 97 Kan. 480, 155 Pac. 920 (1916) ; Barden v. At-
-lantic C. L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910) ; Richardson v. Carbon Hill
Coal Co., 10 Wash. 648, 39 Pac. 95 (1895). Other cases hold such a hospital not
liable on the ground that a railroad is not liable for negligence of physicians.
"England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal. 2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813
(1940).
2" St. Luke's Hospital Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. 2d 917 (1952) ; O'Con-
nor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835 (1939) ;
Vanderbilt University v. Henderson, 23 Tenn. App. 135, 127 S. W. 2d 284 (1938).
" Morton v. Savannah Hospital, 148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (funds from
paying patients); Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention, 55 Ga.
App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (funds from paying patients).
See Notes, 19 N. C. L. Rv. 245 (1941) ; 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 139 (1952).
2 Evans v. Lawrence & Memorial Associated Hospitals, 133 Conn. 311, 50 A. 2d
443 (1946) ; Wilcox v. Idaho Falls Latter Day Saints Hospital, 59 Idaho 350, 82
P. 2d 849 (1938) ; Piper v. Epstein, 326 Ill. App. 400, 62 N. E. 2d 139 (1945) ;
Ratliffe v. Wesley Hospital & Nurses' Training School, 135 Kan. 307, 10 P. 2d
859 (1932) ; Erwin v. St. Joseph's Mercy Hospital, 323 Mich. 114, 34 N. W. 2d
480 (1948); Sibilia v. Paxton Memorial Hospital, 121 Neb. 860, 238 N. W. 751
(1931) ; Woods v. Overlook Hospital Ass'n, 6 N. 3. Super. 47, 69 A. 2d 742 (1949) ;
Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953) ; Lake-
side Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N. E. 2d 857 (1936) ; Gregory v. Salem
General Hospital, 175 Ore. 464, 153 P. 2d 837 (1944) ; Baptist Memorial Hospital
v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951); Meade v. St. Francis
Hospital, 74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953) ; Schau v. Morgan, 241 Wis. 334, 6 N. W.
2d 212 (1942).
"0 Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P. 2d 220 (1951) (expressly
overruling prior decisions) ; England v. Hospital of the Good Samaritan, 14 Cal.
2d 791, 97 P. 2d 813 (1940) (overruling prior decisions) ; Durney v. St. Francis
Hospital, Inc., 83 A. 2d 753 (Del. 1951); Suwannee County Hospital Corp. v.
Golden, 56 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1952); Haynes v. Presbyterian Hospital Ass'n, 241
Iowa 1269, 45 N. W. 2d 151 (1950) (expressly overruling prior decisions) ; Moeller
v. Hauser, 54 N. W. 2d 639 (Minn. 1952) ; Mississippi Baptist Hospital v. Holmes,
214 Miss. 906, 55 So. 2d 142 (1951), affd, 56 So. 2d 709 (Miss. 1952) (expressly
overruling prior decisions) ; Welch v. Frisbie Memorial Hospital, 90 N. H. 337,
9 A. 2d 761 (1939); Pivar v. Manhattan General, Inc., 279 App. Div. 522, 110
N. Y. S. 2d 786 (1952) ; City of Okmulgee v. Carlton, 180 Okla. 605, 71 P. 2d 722
(1937) ; Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 94 Utah 460, 78 P. 2d
645 (1938) ; Pierce v. Yakima Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 260 P. 2d 765 (Wash.
1953) (expressly overruling prior decisions).
1 O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 105 Colo. 259, 96 P. 2d 835
(1939) (liability insurance) ; Robertson v. Executive Comm. of Baptist Convention,
55 Ga. App. 469, 190 S. E. 432 (1937) (funds from paying patients) ; Vanderbilt




visions allowed suit directly against the insurance company although the
hospital if sued could have set up its immunity from tort liability.32 Only
three states within the last three years have denied recovery.
33
The North Carolina Court has said repeatedly that a charitable hos-
pital is not liable to a beneficiary for negligence of its employees if care-
fully selected.34 In only the three cases following have the facts involved
a charitable institution, a beneficiary, and negligence of a carefully se-
lected employee.3 5
In Barden v. Atlantic Coast Line Railway30 the defendant railway
operated a hospital for its employees and 'deducted small amounts monthly
from their wages to help defray the cost of hospital care. In a suit by a
patient, an employee of the railway, for injuries aused by the negligence
of employees of the hospital, the hospital was held a charity and by the
weight of authority in this country not liable for the negligence of its
agents.
37
In Herndon v. Massey3 3 the plaintiff, who had paid a $1 fee to enroll
in a swimming class at the defendant YWCA, was injured by negligence
of its employees. A motion to strike an allegation that the defendant
charitable organization carried liability insurance was granted. In af-
firming, the Supreme Court said that North Carolina followed the ma-
jority rule that a charitable institution is not liable for negligence of
"Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92 F. Supp. 140 (W. D. Ark.
1950) ; Thomas v. Board of County Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 92 A. 2d
452 (Md. 1952).
" Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Baptist Memorial Hospital v. Marrable, 244 S. W. 2d 567 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951);
Meade v. St. Francis Hospital, 74 S. E. 2d 405 (W. Va. 1953).
"Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951) ; Smith v. Duke University 219 N. C. 628, 14 S. E. 2d 643 (1941) (hospital
not liable because negligent physician was not an agent, the court stating that it
was unnecessary to determine whether the hospital was charitable) ; Herndon v.
Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940) ; Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospitals,
197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929) (charitable hospital liable to employee for
negligence of another employee); Johnson v. City Hospital Co., 196 N. C. 610,
146 S. E. 573 (1929) (profit hospital not liable for negligence of physician who
was not an agent of the hospital) ; Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807
(1914) (charitable hospital liable to patient for negligence in selecting incompetent
employee) ; Green v. Biggs, 167 N. C. 417, 83 S. E. 553 (1914) (profit hospital
liable to patient for negligence of employee) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast L. Ry., 152
N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"Williams v. Union County Hospital Ass'n, 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662
(1951) (first time before the Court) ; Herndon v. Massey, 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E.
2d 914 (1940) ; Barden v. Atlantic Coast L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
'7 About half of the cases cited as authority were cases in which railroads had
employed physicians for treatment of employees and in which the question of lia-
bility of a charitable institution was not raised. Those cases cited which dealt with
the question of nonliability of charitable hospitals were based on McDonald v.
Mass. General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) which in turn was based on an early
English case which had already been overruled. See Notes, 30 N. C. L. REv. 67,
n. 3 (1951) ; 25 A. L. R. 2d 29, 38 (1952)." 217 N. C. 610, 8 S. E. 2d 914 (1940).
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employees and held that insurance would not affect the question of
liability.
In Williams v. Union County Hospital39 the plaintiff, a paying patient
in defendant hospital, was injured by the negligence of employees of the
hospital. A demurrer to defendant's answer that it was a nonprofit
charitable corporation and therefore not liable was overruled. In affirm-
ing, the Court repeated the rule of nonliability to beneficiaries but said
that it had not been applied in this state against one who is not a re-
cipient of charity but who pays full compensation.
40
It was on the authority of these cases that the North Carolina Su-
preme Court in 1953 held that a charitable hospital was not liable to a
paying patient for negligence of hospital employees.
41
Nowhere in the North Carolina 'decisions is there a precise state-
ment of the reason, except authority, for the rule of nonliability to bene-
ficiaries. Although the Court in two cases discusses the reasons which
other courts have adopted,42 it does not indicate which, if any, it favors.
The Court has also talked about the policy of effectuating the purposes
for which charitable institutions are established 43 and about being just
before being generous.
44
If these are the criteria, it is interesting to see how the Court has
applied them. An employee of a charitable hospital collected from the
hospital for negligence of a fellow employee. 45 A patient (whether pay
or nonpay is not mentioned) collected from the hospital for its failure
" 234 N. C. 536, 67 S. E. 2d 662 (1951).
"At the subsequent trial a nonsuit was granted at the close of the plaintiff's
evidence. The decision upholding this is the decision in note 1 supra.
" See note 1 supra.
4" Williams v. Randolph Hospital, Inc., 237 N. C. 387, 75 S. E. 2d 303 (1953);
Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914). The theories most generally used
to support immunity for charitable institutions are (1) trust fund, (2) nonapplica-
bility of respondeat superior, (3) implied waiver, and (4) public policy. See
President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810 (D. C.
Cir. 1942). Also Appleman, The Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions, 22
A. B. A. J. 48 (1936); Feezer, The Tort Liability of Charities, 77 U. OF PA. L.
REv. 191 (1928) ; Hansen, Damage Liability of Charitable Corporations, 19 MARQ.
L. REv. 92 (1935); Spencer, Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, A Re-Appraisal of the
Tort Liability of Charities, 24 Rocxy MT. L. REv. 71 (1951); Tulchinsky, Tort
Liability of Charitable Institutions, 13 NoTRE DA 1E LAw. 101 (1937) ; Zollman,
Damage Liability of Charitable Institutions, 19 MIcH. L. Rnv. 395 (1921) ; Notes,
30 N. C. L. REv. 67 (1951); 19 N. C. L. REv. 245 (1941); Comment, 34 YALE L. J.
316 (1924).
' Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 597, 83 S. E. 807, 809 (1914). "If they [chari-
table institutions] are permitted to employ those who are incompetent and unskilled,
funds bestowed for beneficence are diverted from their true purpose, and, under the
form of a charity, they become a menace to those for whose benefit they are estab-
lished. It is, therefore, better for those committed to their care and for the insti-
tutions, and necessary to effectuate the purpose of their creation, to require the
exercise of ordinary care in selecting employees, and in supervising them."
"Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N. C. 798, 3 S. E. 2d 8 (1939) (De-
fendant who was operating a theater and turning over the entire profits to a chari-
table organization was held liable to third party).
"Cowans v. N. C. Baptist Hospitals, 197 N. C. 41, 147 S. E. 672 (1929).
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to select competent employees. 46 A third party collected from a theater
which gave its entire profits to a charitable institution.47 On the other
hand, a patient who had paid in part for his hospital service through
-deductions from his wages4" and the patients who had paid the regular
hospital charges were denied recovery.
49
Thus the persons for whom the hospital was established and who
have paid to receive its services are the ones who are without remedy
when injured by negligence of the hospital's employees. 50 It is difficult
to see why this is sound reason. To say that the patient who pays is
merely making a contribution to charity or contracts only for carefully
selected employees is patent fiction, contrary to both fact and popular
understanding. To say that the hospital is in danger of destruction if
held liable is to ignore the character and size of the modem hospital and
the use of liability insurance as an ordinary expense of doing business.
To say that the injured individual must bear his own loss is to ignore
the trend in other fields toward distribution of risks through such means
as Workmen's Compensation or state and Federal tort claims acts.51
Perhaps, as the Court suggested in Williams v. Randolph Hospital,
Inc., a change in the rule exempting the charitable hospital from lia-
bility is a question of policy to be pondered and resolved not by the
courts but by the legislature.52  Recently legislatures in at least two
states have partially changed the rule of immunity, not directly by
making hospitals liable, but by allowing direct suit against the hospital's
insurance carrier and forbidding the carrier from setting up the hos-
pital's defense of immunity.53 The North Carolina Legislature, six
weeks after the Randolph Hospital case, apparently reconsidered its
policy as applied to state hospitals and adopted a rule of strict immunity
for state hospitals although the state remains liable for injuries caused
by other state agencies.5
4
Thus it would appear that North Carolina through both its courts
and its legislature has steadfastly set its face toward the nineteenth cen-
"Hoke v. Glenn, 167 N. C. 594, 83 S. E. 807 (1914).
" Turnage v. New Bern Consistory, 215 N. C. 798, 3 S. E. 2d 8 (1939).
'" Barden v. Atlantic C. L. Ry., 152 N. C. 318, 67 S. E. 971 (1910).
"See note 1 supra.
90 To say that most surgeons carry malpractice insurance is only a partial an-
swer. Many injuries are caused by employees who are clearly servants of the
hospital and who probably do not carry insurance.
" But see N. C. SEss. LAWS 1953, c. 1314 amending the 1951 State Tort Claims
Act so as to make it inapplicable to persons injured by the negligence of physicians,
nurses, and employees of state hospitals and other state medical institutions. Dis-
cussed in 31 N. C. L. RBv. 443 (1953).
92237 N. C. 387, 392, 75 S. E. 2d 303, 306 (1953).
"ARK. STAT. § 66-517 (1947), Michael v. St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 92
F. Supp. 140 (W. D. Ark. 1950); MD. ANN. CODE GEN. LAWS art. 48A § 82
(1951), Thomas v. Board of County Comm'rs of Prince George's County, 92 A. 2d
452 (Md. 1952).
' See note 51 supra.
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tury doctrine of immunity for charitable hospitals while an increasing
number of states turn toward a rule of liability more in keeping with
twentieth century public policy.
JEANNE OWEN
Torts-Physician and Surgeon-Liability for Acts of Assistants-
Respondeat Superior
An action for damages, involving two appeals to the North Carolina
Supreme Court,' arose out of the death of plaintiff's intestate following
an operation performed by defendant physician. At the trial stage non-
suits were entered as to defendant's hospital and nurse, and a verdict was
rendered in favor of the physician. On appeal2 the non-suits were
affirmed3 and a new trial was ordered as to the physician because of
error in the trial judge's charge to the jury.4 On retrial, a verdict was
again rendered in favor of the physician. This was reversed and another
trial ordered as to the physician,5 the court holding that the trial judge
erred when he instructed the jury that the nurse was not an "employee"
of the physician and that the physician would not be responsible for the
negligence of the nurse, thus excluding the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior from consideration.
The responsibility of a physician for the acts of his assistants has
been the subject of litigation in other courts, and the resulting decisions
make it clear that a physician may be liable in this situation (1) for his
own negligence, in causing or allowing an assistant to injure a patient,
or (2) for the assistant's negligence, which is imputed to the physician
under the principles of agency.
A physician may be personally negligent in employing, retaining or
using an incompetent assistant, as when he engages a layman to adminis-
ter chloroform.6 It is his legal -duty to see that the entire treatment of
his patient is carried on correctly, but he may properly delegate simple
tasks to his assistants, and thereby relieve himself of legal responsibility.
7
'Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N. C. 259, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1952) ; Jackson v. Mountain
Sanitarium, 234 N. C. 222, 67 S. E. 2d 57 (1951), rehearing denied, 235 N. C. 758,
69 S. E. 2d 29 (1952).
2 Jackson v. Mountain Sanitarium, 234 N. C. 222, 67 S. E. 2d 57 (1951).
3Id. at 225, 67 S. E. 2d at 60.
The judge instructed the jury in such a manner as to require expert testimony
to establish the physician's liability, and this was held error. The court also held
that the trial judge erred in not admitting a written report offered in evidence by
the plaintiff. Id. at 255, 67 S. E. 2d at 60.
'Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N. C. 259, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1952).
'Nations v. Ludington Lumber Co., 133 La. 657, 63 So. 257 (1913). See,
Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F. 2d 494, 496 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Reynolds v. Smith, 148
Iowa 264, 269, 127 N. W. 192, 194 (1910); Morrison v. Henke, 165 Wis. 166, 167,
160 N. W. 173, 174 (1917).
Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S. W. 524 (1925) ; Funk v. Bonham,
151 N. E. 22 (Ill. Ct. App. 1926) ; Hunner v. Stevenson, 122 Md. 40, 89 Atl. 418
(1913) ; Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N. E. 451 (1928) ; Saucier v. Ross,
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Thus a physician may authorize a nurse to place hot water bottles or
hot flat-irons against the body of a patient after an operation, and he is
not liable for the nurse's negligence in doing this.8 However, some
courts will not allow the physician to escape responsibility by assigning
an assistant the task of counting the gauzes or sponges used in a surgical
operation, and relying on the assistant to determine that all the gauzes
placed in the patient's body have been removed.) Other courts are not
so strict, and reason that the physician bears such complicated and varied
responsibilities that he should be allowed to delegate more important
tasks to his assistants, including the counting of gauzes.10 The physi-
cian is also liable for negligently instructing or supervising an assistant
who is administering treatment, and the assistant is not liable in this
situation when he does no more than carry out the specific instructions
of the physician or otherwise meets the legal duty required of him."
In each of these situations, it is the physician's own negligence that is
the basis for his liability, if any, and the doctrine of respondeat superior
is not applied.
Whenever the issue is whether the physician is liable for the negli-
gence of his assistants, the problem arises as to what establishes the
relationship of principal and agent. If it appears that the assistant is in
the pay of the physician, and is acting under the immediate control of
the physician, the relationship is said to exist.' 2 Again, the relationship
obviously exists whenever the assistant is in the pay of the physician
and is carrying out his general 'duties, or following some general instruc-
tion of the physician, although not under his immediate control.'3  Not
112 Miss. 306, 73 So. 49 (1916) ; Niebel v. Winslow, 88 N. J. L. 191, 95 Atl. 995
(1915) ; Stewart v. Manasses, 244 Pa. 221, 90 Atl. 574 (1914) ; Jackson v. Han-
sard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 P. 2d 659 (1933) ; Jewison v. Hassard, 26 Man. L. R. 571,
28 Dom. L. R. 584 (Canada 1916).
8Olson v. Bolstad, 161 Minn. 419, 201 N. W. 918 (1925) (flat-irons); Dals-
gaard v. Meierding, 140 Minn. 443, 168 N. W. 584 (1918) (flat-irons) ; Stewart v.
Manasses, 244 Pa. 221, 90 Atl. 574 (1914) (hot water bottle); Malkowski v.
Graham, 169 Wis. 398, 172 N. W. 785 (1919) (hot iron).
'Spears v. McKinnon, 168 Ark. 357, 270 S. W. 524 (1925) ; Ault v. Hall, 119
Ohio St. 422, 164 N. E. 518 (1928) ; Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 P. 2d
659 (1933) ; Walker v. Holbrook, 130 Minn. 106, 153 N. W. 305 (1915).
1 Funk v. Bonham, 151 N. E. 22 (Ill. Ct. App. 1926) ; Hunner v. Stevenson, 122
Md. 40, 89 AtI. 418 (1913) ; Guell v. Tenney, 262 Mass. 54, 159 N. E. 541 (1928) ;
Niebel v. Winslow, 88 N. J. L. 191, 95 Atl. 995 (1915) ; Jewison v. Hassard, 26
Man. L. R. 571, 28 Dom. L. R. 584 (Canada 1916).
" Davis v. Rodman, 147 Ark. 385, 227 S. W. 612 (1921) ; Kershaw v. Tilbury,
214 Calif. 679, 8 P. 2d 109 (1932) ; Everts v. Worrell, 58 Utah 238, 197 Pac. 1043
(1921) ; Lawson v. Crane, 83 Vt. 115, 74 Atl. 641 (1909) ; Miles v. Hoffman, 127
Wash. 653, 221 Pac. 316 (1923).
"' More specifically, this is the "employer-employee" relationship. Boetcher v.
Budd, 61 N. D. 50, 237 N. W. 650 (1931) ; Aderhold v. Stewart, 172 Okla. 72, 46
P. 2d 340 (1935).
" This, again, is more specifically described as the "employer-employee" rela-
tionship. Mullins v. Du Vall, 25 Ga. App. 690, 104 S. E. 513 (1920); Simons v.
Northern Pacific Ry., 94 Mont. 355, 22 P. 2d 609 (1933) ; Gill v. Selling, 124 Ore.
587, 267 Pac. 812 (1928). See, Rath v. Craddock, 65 Ohio App. 135, 29 N. E. 2d
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all decisions are so clear cut, however, there being many instances where
the assistant who aids the patient's physician is paid and retained by the
hospital, or by the patient himself. The weight of authority in these
situations is that the assistant is the agent of the physician when and
if the latter is in "control" of the assistant.' 4
The courts will ordinarily consider the physician in "control" when
he is in charge of treatment, and is present in the room with the patient
and the assistant during the administration of treatment. 15 It is im-
portant that the physician be present in the room, and that the operation
or treatment still be in progress, for there is no "control" whenever the
physician is not present, or during "after-treatment," even though the
assistant, not an "employee," may be acting in obedience to the physi-
cian's orders.' 6 If the physician is liable under the doctrine of respondeat
superior, it is of course necessary to show that the assistant was negli-
gent, because this basis for liability is the negligence of the assistant
which is imputed to the physician.
Cases wherein a physician's liability is based on his own negligence
in causing an assistant to injure a patient, and those where in liability
is based on the negligence of his assistant, are often much alike.' 7 There-
fore it is difficult to determine what reasoning the court has used in
establishing the liability of the physician, unless the court specifically
426 (1940) (Assistant physician, retained by employer physician as an employee,
turned a patient over to a nurse, also an employee, who placed the patient in the
hands of a "girl in blue," also an employee; patient sued the assistant physician and
alleged that she was injured by the acts of the "girl in blue," but the court held
that he was not liable, for one employee is not responsible for the negligence of a
fellow employee).
" Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P. 2d 409 (1936) ; Jordon v. Touro Infirmary,
123 So. 726 (La. Ct. App. 1922), explained in Messina v. Societe Francaise, 170
So. 801, 803 (La. Ct. App. 1936) ; Hall v. Enid General Hospital, 194 Okla. 446,
152 P. 2d 693 (1944); Randolph v. Oklahoma City General Hospital, 180 Okla. 513,
71 P. 2d 607 (1937); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949).
"Gray v. McLaughlin, 207 Ark. 191, 179 S. W. 2d 686 (1944) ; Ales v. Ryan,
8 Cal. 2d 82, 64 P. 2d 409 (1936) ; Jordon v. Touro Infirmary, 123 So. 726 (La.
Ct. App. 1922), explained in Messina v. Societe Francaise, 170 So. 801, 803 (La.
Ct. App. 1936) ; Noren v. American School of Osteopathy, 298 S. W. 1061 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1927), affd in 223 Mo. App. 278, 2 S. W. 2d 215 (1928) ; Hall v. Enid
General Hospital, 194 Okla. 446, 152 P. 2d 693 (1944) ; Aderhold v. Bishop, 94
Okla. 203, 221 Pac. 752 (1923) ; McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243
(1949).
26 Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F. 2d 494 (D. C. Cir. 1940) ; Harlan v. Bryant, 87
F. 2d 170 (7th Cir. 1936) ; Harris v. Fall, 177 Fed. 79 (7th Cir. 1910) ; Sheridan v.
Quarrier, 127 Conn. 279, 16 A. 2d 479 (1940) ; Messina v. Societe Francaise, 170 So.
801 (La. Ct. App. 1936) ; Blackman v. Zeligs, 90 Ohio App. 304, 103 N. E. 2d 13
(1951); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A. 2d 243 (1949); Meadows v.
Patterson, 21 Tenn. App. 283, 109 S. W. 2d 417 (1937).
Jackson v. Hansard, 45 Wyo. 201, 17 P. 2d 659 (1933) (Physician held liable
for his own negligence in allowing an assistant to leave a gauze in a patient's
body) ; Armstrong v. Wallace, 37 P. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1934) (Physician held




explains itself.' 8 The writer suggests that this distinction should be
spelled-out, because it may have the very practical significance of de-
termining whether a judgment will be ordered against the assistant, and
in the absence of the agency relationship or the assistant's negligence, the
physician may be personally liable for a failure to exercise the proper
degree of skill, care and judgment that he owes his patient.'9
The North Carolina decisions are fundamentally in accord with the
weight of authority in other jurisdictions,20 except for a dictum in the
principle case.2 1 There the court awarded a non-suit to the nurse on
first appeal, and on later appeal found reversible error in the trial judge's
charge that the negligence of the nurse could not be imputed to the phy-
sician. This seems inconsistent because the non-suit indicated that the
nurse was not negligent, but the dictum explained that under these cir-
cumstances the nurse need not stand responsible for his own "tortuous
act," although he might have been negligent and the physician might be
liable for the nurse's negligence under the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior.22  This was said to be an exception to the law of agency.23  A
"S Frequently the assistant is not joined in the action, and his liability, which
would show whether he was negligent and help to determine whether the doctrine
of respondeat superior was a part of the court's reasoning, is not in issue.
"' The positive duty of the physician is well-stated in Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C.
408, 127 S. E. 356 (1925). See, PRossm, LAw oF TORTs 237 (1941).
-o In Bowditch v. French Broad Hospital, 201 N. C. 168, 159 S. E. 350 (1931)
where the hospital arranged for a nurse to serve a patient and help a physician,
and the nurse was paid by the patient, the Court indicated that the nurse might be
an independent contractor or an agent of the physician, but held that she was not
the agent of the hospital.
Where a nurse placed an improper and harmful solution in a newborn baby's
eyes while the physician was occupied with the mother, the nurse was held not to
be the agent of the physician. Covington v. Wyatt, 196 N. C. 367, 145 S. E. 673
(1928), discussed in 7 N. C. L. Rmv. 330 (1929). This may mean that the court
will apply the "control" test of agency in narrow fashion, or it may be explained
that an emergency or complicated task destroys the physician's "control" over the
assistant. No cases were found in which a physician was held liable for the neg-
ligence of his assistant under the doctrine of respondeat superior, although such a
decision was explicitly authorized in Nash v. Royster, 189 N. C. 408, 412, 127 S. E.
356, 359 (1925).
In Byrd v. Marion General Hospital, 202 N. C. 337, 162 S. E. 738 (1932), a
nurse, employed by a hospital but acting under the direction of an attending phy-
sician, injured a patient. The patient sued the managing physician of the hospital
and the nurse, but not the attending physician. The court reversed a jury verdict
against the managing physician only, and held that since the nurse was not negli-
gent, the managing physician could not be liable. The court states the rule of
the Byrd case in these words: ". . . if the physician [referring to the attending
physician who was not joined] is present and undertakes to give directions, or ...
stands by, approving the treatment administered by the nurse, unless the treatment
is obviously negligent and dangerous, ... in such event the nurse can then assume
that the treatment is proper under the circumstances, and such treatment, when the
physician is present, becomes the treatment of the physician and not that of the
nurse." Id. at 343, 162 S. E. at 741.
" Jackson v. Joyner, 236 N. C. 259, 72 S. E. 2d 589 (1952).
22 Id. at 262, 72 S. E. 2d at 592 (". . . it is observed that the principle ...
stands as an exception to the general rule that an agent who does a tortuous act is
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possible explanation of this dictum is that the court took a decision
indicating that a physician might be liable for his own negligence in
causing an assistant to injure a patient, and read into it an application
of the doctrine of respondeat superior.
It is submitted, in the light of decisions of this and other jurisdic-
tions, that the test for determining the liability of any physician or any
assistant, free from all exceptions, should be the ordinary one of whether
each was negligent; or if the assistant alone is negligent, whether the
agency relationship existed.
Roy W. DAVIS, JR.
Wills-Revocation-Attempted Revocation of Unexecuted Copy
The testatrix's notation of "Null and Void, S.H.K." at the top of
an unexecuted carbon copy of her will was recently held by the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court to be an effective revocation.' The court found
the notation to be "other writing" within the meaning of that jurisdic-
tion's statutory provision regarding revocation of testamentary papers.-
Although the intention of the testator to nullify may be evidenced by
his words and actions,3 the privilege of execution or revocation of wills
is granted by the state, and as a corollary, the testator must act in com-
plete accord with the controlling statute in order to make or nullify a
will.4 Ordinarily, the statutes provide three permissible methods of
revocation of a will :5 (1) execution of a subsequent will or codicil; (2)
making of some other writing declaring the will revoked; and (3) by
tearing, burning, cancelling, or obliterating the document itself.0  Thus
the distinction between a "cancellation" as a method of revocation and
not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command or under the
direction of his principal.").
2 ' Such an exception is clearly contradicted in Ybara v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d
486, 492, 154 P. 2d 687, 690 (1945) : "Any defendent who negligently injured him
[the patient], and any defendant charged with his care who so neglected him as to
allow injury to occur, would be liable. The defendant employers would be liable
for the neglect of their employees; and the doctor in charge of the operation would
be liable for the negligence of those who became his temporary servants for the
purpose of assisting in the operation." For a statement of the law applicable to
situations herein discussed, see Hohenthal v. Smith, 114 F. 2d 494 (D. C. Cir.
1940).
'In re Kehr's Estate, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A. 2d 647 (1953).
- PA. STAT. tit. 20, § 180.5 (1950).
' The testatrix in the principal case did not have the original document but
after writing on the carbon, she wrote her attorney stating that she had cancelled
her will.
' Parker v. Foreman, 252 Ala. 77, 39 So. 2d 574 (1949) ; Re Johannes' Estate,
170 Kan. 407, 227 P. 2d 148 (1951) ; Crampton v. Osburn, 356 Mo. 125, 201 S. W.
2d 336 (1947) ; Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 441 (1883) ; Churchill's Estate, 260 Pa.
94, 103 Atl. 533 (1918).
' The North Carolina statute is typical. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 31-5 (1950).
O Revocation by a subsequent will or codicil is not within the purview of this
note. For a discussion of this, see Zacharias and Maschinot, Revocation and Re-
vival of Wills, 25 CI-KENT L. REv. 185, 201 (1947).
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the use of some "other writing" for such a purpose is usually pointed
up in the various state statutes by specifying the two methods of revoca-
tion in the alternative. 7
A cancellation or obliteration of a will is the doing of a physical act
to the paper itself,8 and it is usually held that in order to be effective,
some material part of the document or some of the words in the text of
the will must be marked over.9 A mere notation in the margin or on the
back of the paper is generally held insufficient to constitute this type of
revocation."0
The above discussed methods of revocation and their limitations also
apply in the case of executed duplicate wills where the testator attempts
to revoke by cancelling, tearing, or burning one of the two copies. The
general rule throughout the United States is that when a testator tears
or obliterates his copy, this works a revocation of the duplicate in the
hands of someone else.1 Furthermore, when the testator was known to
be in possession of a copy of a will and such copy is found after his death
in a mutilated condition, there arises a rebuttable presumption that he
acted aninto revocandi, and therefore, no other duplicate or conformed
copy may be admitted to probate. 12  This same principle applies when
the testator's copy cannot be found after his death and it is known that
there was a duplicate in his possession.'3 However, the presumption is
' The statutes of forty states make this distinction. The laws of Connecticut
[CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6956 (1949)] ; Illinois [ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 148, § 19 (1951)] ;
Iowa [IowA CODE ANN. c. 32, § 633.10 (1950)] ; Missouri [Mo. Rav. STAT. § 20.521
(1949)]; Nevada [Nty. Comp. LAws § 9912 (1929)]; Washington [WASH. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 11.12.040 (1931) ] ; and Wyoming [Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 6-306
(1945)] have no provision for revocation by "other writing." The Tennessee
Statute [TENN. CODE ANN. § 8097 (1934)] prohibits the revocation of a written
will by a nuncupative will but is silent as to other methods of revocation. For a
complete compilation of state statutes pertaining to wills, see THOMPSON, WILLS
(Supp. 1950).
'It re Smith's Estate, 77 F. Supp. 217 (D. C. D. C. 1948) ; Meredith v. Mere-
dith, 5 Harr. (Del.) 35, 157 Atl. 202 (Super. Ct. 1931) ; In re Semler's Will, 176
Misc. 687, 28 N. Y. S. 2d 390 (Surr. Ct. 1941); In re Heller's Estate, 158 Pa.
Super. 194, 44 A. 2d 528 (1945) ; Franklin v. McLean, 192 Va. 684, 66 S. E. 2d 504
(1951). See also, Note, 24 A. L. R. 2d 517 (1952).
'In re Berman's Will, 185 Misc. 1037, 58 N. Y. S. 2d 512 (Surr. Ct. 1945)
In re Love, 186 N. C. 714, 120 S. E. 479 (1923) ; Thompson v. Royal, 163 Va. 492,
175 S. E. 748 (1943). Contra: Franklin v. Bogue, 245 Ala. 379, 17 So. 2d 405
(1944) ; Evan's Appeal, 58 Pa. 238 (1868).
"0 Howard v. Hunter, 115 Ga. 357, 41 S. E. 638 (1902) (on back of the page)
In re Hinker's Estate, 158 Kan. 406, 147 Pac. 740 (1944) ; Sanderson v. Norcross,
242 Mass. 43, 136 N. E. 176 (1922) (margin). See also I PAGE, WILLS, § 430,
p. 778 (3rd ed. 1941).
"Re Holmburg's Estate, 400 Ill. 366, 81 N. E. 2d 188 (1948) ; In re Beaney's
Estate, 62 N. Y. S. 2d 341 (Surr. Ct. 1946) ; I PAGE, WILLS, § 437 (3rd ed. 1941) ;
ATKINSON, WILLS, p. 376 (1937). For a collection of cases to this effect, see, Note,
48 A. L. R. 297 (1927).
12 See note 11 supra, and note 13 infra; but this presumption is not conclusive.
See, E.g., Re Walsh, 196 Mich. 42, 163 N. W. 70 (1917).
"1 Mangle v. Parker, 75 N. H. 139, 71 Atl. 637 (1908) ; In re Bett's Will, 200
Misc. 633, 107 N. Y. S. 2d 626 (Surr. Ct. 1951) ; In re Will of Wall, 223 N. C.
591, 27 S. E. 2d 728 (1943) ; Bate's Estate, 286 Pa. 583, 134 Atl. 513 (1926).
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sufficiently rebutted when it can be proved that the mutilation or de-
struction was an accident,14 or that the testator was under the impres-
sion that the remaining copy would still be valid after the duplicate was
destroyed.
15
In a majority of the decisions where revocation was found as a result
of cancellation or other writings on duplicate wills, both copies had been
executed.' 6  It is to be noted that this element of execution is lacking
in the principal case, 17 for there is obviously a material difference be-
tween a signed duplicate original and an unexecuted carbon copy of a
will.' 8 Furthermore, in those jurisdictions where the question of revo-
cation has arisen as to unsigned copies, the courts have generally been
hesitant to extend the law to allow an attempted cancellation of an un-
executed copy.'9
In a leading case on this problem, In re Wehr's Will,20 the testator,
having left the original will in the custody of his attorney, had in his
possession a conformed copy which was found in a mutilated condition
after his death. The Wisconsin Court there said in answer to the re-
spondent's contention of revocation: "There is no authority whatever
to the effect that destruction or mutilation of a copy of the will, con-
formed or othervise, is effective to accomplish a revocation. . . . It
seems to us that to hold that a mutilation of a conformed copy was a
revocation would be to interpolate or add to the statute what plainly is
not there or to establish a symbolic revocation by a judicial decree in
the face of a statute which plainly does not mean to recognize it."21
", In re Martin's Will, 180 Misc. 113, 40 N. Y. S. 2d 685 (Surr. Ct. 1943) (ink
was spilled on the original at the time of execution and it was discarded with no
intention of revocation.)
" In re Patterson's Estate, 55 Cal. 626, 102 Pac. 941 (1909) ; Mangle v. Parker,
75 N. H. 139, 71 Atl. 637 (1908) ; Combs v. Howard, 131 S. W. 2d 206 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1939).
The courts differ as to what inference may be said to arise when the testator
had possession of both copies, one of which is not found after his death, the more
recent cases holding that there is no revocation and allowing the discovered dupli-
cate to be probated. Phinizee v. Alexander, 210 Miss. 196, 49 So. 2d 250 (1950)
(where one copy found in a mutilated condition, it was held that there was no
revocation on the grounds that if the testator had intended to have voided his will,
he would have cancelled both duplicates) ; In re Mittelslaedt's Will, 280 App. Div.
163, 112 N. Y. S. 2d 166 (1st Dept. 1952) (one of two duplicates which had been
in the testator's possession found and admitted to probate, the court holding there
to be no revocation.) Contra: ATImsox, WILLS, p. 376 (1937) ; I PAGE, WILLS,
§ 437 (3rd ed. 1941), citing English decisions.
" See notes 11-15 supra.
"In re Kehr's Estate, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A. 2d 647 (1953).
" In Hull v. Cartin, 61 Idaho 578, 105 P. 2d 196 (1940), the court said: "The
copy ... falls short of being a 'duplicate original' in the vital and essential particu-
lar that it was never executed by being signed and witnessed." See; In re Kehr's
Estate, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A. 2d 647, 651 (1953) (dissent).
1 See notes 20, 21 infra; I PAGE, WILLS, § 437, p. 83 (1950 Supp.) ("Tearing,
etc., an unexecuted copy of a will is not a revocation of such will.").
2 247 Wis. 98, 18 N. W. 2d 709 (1945).
"it re Wehr's Will, 247 Wis. 98, 110, 18 N. W. 2d 709, 715 (1945). The
Wehr case was cited with approval in In re D'Agostino's Will, 9 N. J. Super. 230,
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Only one case is found which seems to concur with the principal
case. -2 2 There the court, by dictum, indicated that the revocatory writing
was a valid nullification per se, without giving any particular significance
to the fact that the writing happened to be on an unexecuted copy of the
will.
The North Carolina Court has never faced the problem involved in
the Kehr case but seems to concur with the majority rules as regards
revocation of wills generally in that there must be a strict compliance
with the statute,23 that parol evidence may not be introduced to add to
or interpolate a written revocation,24 and that part of the will itself must
be crossed through in order for a cancellation to be effective.2 5  In the
only case in which the North Carolina Court has been faced with a
problem involving duplicate wills, it was held that a presumption of
ievocation arose when one duplicate could not be found and that the
jury should decide whether or not this presumption had been sufficiently
rebutted.
2 6
In the principal case, the majority opinion readily concedes that the
revocation there attempted could not be a cancellation, because the copy
had no validity or life to be voided, 27 but found the notation on the
unexecuted copy to be effective as another writing.
The interpretation placed by the courts on the statutory phrase "other
writing" varies, but in the majority of the jurisdictions the "other writ-
ing" must be executed with the same formalities required for the execu-
tion of the will in the first instance.28  The majority opinion in the
principal case argues that this requirement has been met. However, it
75 A. 2d 913 (App. Div. 1950) where the testator tore his unexecuted copy and
threw the pieces into the wastebasket. The court held there to be no revocation,
regardless of the testator's intent, because the requisites of the statute were not
met.2 n re Smith's Estate, 31 Cal. 2d 563, 191 P. 2d 413 (1948).
2' Davis v. King, 89 N. C. 441 (1883).
Ibid.
2'In re Love, 186 N. C. 714, 120 S. E. 479 (1923) ; In re Shelton's Will, 143
N. C. 218, 55 S. E. 705 (1906).
" Is re Will of Wall, 223 N. C. 591, 27 S. E. 2d 728 (1943). No North Caro-
lina case with more similar or closely analogous facts to those in the principal
case is to be found. However, on related issues, North Carolina is in accord with
those jurisdictions holding contra to the principal case, and so it would appear that
should the problem involved in the principal case be presented to the North Caro-
lina Supreme Court, North Carolina would hold contra to the decision in the Kehr
case."'In re Kehr's Estate, 373 Pa. 473, 95 A. 2d 647, 650 (1953).
.- Depending on the relevant state statute, this can mean that the testator must
sign the revocation, and in some jurisdictions, it must be witnessed. See N. C. GEN.
STAT. § 31-5 (1950) ; Dowling v. Gilliland, 286 ILL. 530, 122 N. E. 70 (1919) (at-
tempted revocation invalid because not witnessed); it re Konner's Estate, 101
N. Y. S. 2d 651 (Surr. Ct. 1950) (an invalid will held as an effective revocation
of a prior will) ; In re William's Estate, 336 Pa. 235, 9 A. 2d 377 (1939) (no revo-
cation because attempted revocatory writing not signed.) See also, Note, 3 A. L. R.
833 (1919).
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seems that parol evidence would be needed to explain the notation as
being meant to apply to the original executed will, while the generally
accepted rule, both in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, is to the effect that
the "other writing" must be self-sufficient, with parol evidence being used
only to explain any ambiguous words employed, not to evidence what
the testator intended the writing to mean.
2 9
The writer submits that the decision in the Kehr case is a substantial
extension of the statutory right of revocation of wills, with far too much
emphasis being placed on surrounding circumstances and insufficient
stress being placed on the attempted revocatory act itself.
ROBERT C. VAUGHN, JR.
In re Maloney's Estate, 27 Cal. App. 2d 332, 80 P. 2d 998 (1938) ; McIver v.
McKinney, 184 N. C. 393, 114 S. E. 399 (1922) ; In re Myer's Estate, 351 Pa. 472,
41 A. 2d 570 (1945) ; Industrial Trust Co. v. Wilson, 61 R. I. 169, 200 Atl. 467
(1938) ; Rule v. First National Bank of Clifton Forge, 182 Va. 227, 28 S. E. 2d
709 (1944).
